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Zusammenfassung
Information ist eines der ho¨chsten Gu¨ter unserer Gesellschaft, sichere Kommunika-
tion essenziell fu¨r Wirtschaft, nationale und internationale Stabilita¨t. Die Quanten-
schlu¨sselverteilung (QKD) hat ein Problem der klassischen Informatik, na¨mlich den
sicheren Austausch kryptographischer Schlu¨ssel, gelo¨st. In den vergangenen 27 Jah-
ren seit der Erfindung der QKD wurde viel Aufwand getrieben, sie fu¨r praktische
Anwendungen einsetzbar zu machen und die Lu¨cke zwischen theoretischen Sicher-
heitsbeweisen und realen Gera¨ten zu schließen.
Diese Arbeit berichtet von verschiedenen Aspekten unseres freiraumoptischen QKD-
Systems. Im ersten Teil wird dessen Einbindung in das europa¨ische QKD-Netzwerk
im Rahmen des SECOQC-Projekts beschrieben, fu¨r das dieses System u¨ber andert-
halb Monate verla¨sslich sicheres Schlu¨sselmaterial geliefert hat. Das Gera¨t arbeitete
dort erstmals tagsu¨ber, ohne dass die helle Umgebung einen wesentlichen Einfluss
auf den Betrieb hatte. So wurde die Tagungssta¨tte mit dem faserbasierten QKD-
Basisnetz verbunden und die Realisierbarkeit heterogener QKD-Netzwerke besta¨tigt.
Das zweite Hauptaugenmerk dieser Arbeit liegt auf der Sicherheitsanalyse unseres
QKD-Systems. Obwohl die Sicherheit des QKD-Prinzips zweifellos bewiesen ist, pas-
sen die Annahmen in diesen Beweisen nicht zu den realen Ausfu¨hrungen der QKD-
Systeme. Daher ist es u¨beraus wichtig, diese Diskrepanz allma¨hlich zu beseitigen.
Ein vielversprechender Ansatz dazu ist die Adaption des klassischen Zertifizierungs-
prozesses. Dabei wird innerhalb ein Annahmenkatalog aufgestellt und gezeigt, dass
jeder bekannte Angriff durch Gegenmaßnahmen abgesichert ist. In der vorliegen-
den Arbeit wird (soweit anwendbar) dieser systematische Ansatz verfolgt, um die
Schwachstellen und mo¨gliche Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu diskutieren.
Eine dieser implementierungsabha¨ngigen Schlupflo¨cher, na¨mlich die Totzeit von Ein-
zelphotondetektoren wurde ausgenutzt, um einen neuen Angriff auf das System
durchzufu¨hren. Es war dadurch mo¨glich, mehr als 98% des Schlu¨ssels abzuho¨ren,
ohne einzelne Photonen detektieren zu mu¨ssen. Das zeigt eindru¨cklich, dass unse-
re Attacke eine unmittelbare Gefahr darstellt. Glu¨cklicherweise gibt es eine einfa-
che Maßnahme gegen diesen Angriff: Indem man die Vorspannung der Detektoren
u¨berwacht, kann man entscheiden, ob alle aktiv sind. Werden nur diese Ereignisse
fu¨r die Schlu¨sselgenerierung verwendet, kann man diese und a¨hnliche Angriffe sicher
abwenden.
Bisher verwenden einige wenige Banken QKD-Systeme, um ihre Daten zu schu¨tzen.
Ist die Sicherheit dieser Gera¨te zertifiziert, die Integration unpromlematisch und
natu¨rlich der Preis gerechtfertigt, wird erwartet, dass der Bedarf deutlich steigt.
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Abstract
Information is one of the key assets of our society. Secure communication is vital
for economy, national and international stability. Quantum key distribution (QKD)
has closed a remaining security loophole in classical information science, namely the
secure cryptographic key exchange. In the past 27 years since the invention of QKD
a lot of effort has been invested to bring QKD to practical applicability and bridge
the gap between the theoretic security proofs and real devices.
This document reports on several aspects of our free-space quantum key distribution
system. The first part covers the integration of this system into the European QKD
network within the project SECOQC, where it was reliably producing secure key
material during a period of about 1.5 months. There, the system worked even in
bright daylight without significant influence on the output. It connected the public
demonstration venue to the fibre based QKD backbone. The results of the project
show that even heterogeneous QKD networks are feasible with today’s technology.
The second focus of this work is the security analysis of our QKD system. While
it is true that the security of the QKD principle is proven, the assumptions of
these proofs are not met in realistic devices. Hence it is of utmost importance that
this discrepancy will be diminished and eventually closed. One promising approach
to this end could be to adopt the methodology of classical counterparts, e.g. the
certification process. There, a set of assumptions is compiled and within these
assumptions it is made plausible that every possible threat is countered by a measure
to ensure security. In this document this systematic procedure (to the extent that
seemed appropriate) has been used to report on the possible vulnerabilities and their
potential countermeasures concerning this specific QKD system.
One of these implementation-specific loopholes, the dead time of the single photon
detectors has been exploited in particular to launch a new attack on our QKD
system. It was possible to gain more than 98% of the sifted key without even
having to intercept the single photon stream from legitimate transmitter to receiver.
This fact clearly shows that our attack is one of the most imminent threats to the
system. Fortunately, a possible countermeasure against this attack is as simple: By
monitoring the bias voltage of the single photon detectors it can be evaluated if all
detectors were active at the time of a detection event. When only those events are
being processed this and similar attacks are rendered impossible.
So far, a few banks are slowly employing QKD systems to protect their data. Given
certified security for those devices, unproblematic integration into the existing net-
works and of course a justifiable price, the demand is expected to grow significantly.
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1 Introduction
Digital communication plays an increasingly important role in almost everybody’s
life. People send and receive emails, go shopping in the world-wide web and manage
their bank accounts and transactions conveniently from their homes. While some of
these activities are relatively insensitive to security issues, some certainly are not.
The fact that the new German identity card contains a digital identification option
indicates that secured digital communication will soon also replace (at least partly)
the conventional exchange of information between citizens and governmental orga-
nisations. As first examples, tax information has started to be delivered digitally,
and public authorities have huge amounts of sensitive data to convey between them.
Either because of privacy protection or for reasons of national security, this informa-
tion has to remain secret to anybody but the legitimate receiver. The advantage of
the structure of the internet, which connects more or less everyone to everyone else
also is a possible security problem: Nobody can predict which route the information
will take and who can gain access to it.
Cryptographic methods have been installed to prevent sensitive data from being read
or even changed. Unfortunately, the security of most of those methods is very hard
to assess. For example, asymmetric cryptography, widely used for securing most
standard web transactions with security needs (like web-based bank transactions)
relies on the fact that it is difficult to factorise large numbers into their constituting
primes. Although one does not know a classical algorithm to solve such a problem
efficiently today, it could not be shown (despite a lot of effort over the past centuries)
that there is none. In fact, one of the most outstanding features of a quantum
computer is the option to use the so-called Shor algorithm which does exactly that:
factorising large integers in polynomial time. Not only because of that it is believed
that while asymmetric cryptography (as used today) is supposedly secure today, it
may only stay so for 10 or 20 more years. For many applications hardly anybody will
be concerned about that; the data from most private transactions will be irrelevant
in 10 or 20 years. But, especially when public authorities are involved, this may not
be case. National (or international) security matters should hopefully be secure for
a longer period of time and even private data like tax or health information should –
for privacy protection – stay hidden ideally forever. This does not hold today. One
could simply store the encrypted data and wait until the code can be broken and
thus gain all information, even if after a long delay.
Yet, there is a information theoretically (i.e. provably) secure symmetric crypto-
graphy algorithm, the so-called one-time pad or Vernam cipher. It even is very
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straightforward to perform, one simply needs a random bit string (called key) of
the same length as the message and combines both by an XOR operation. All the
receiver has to do are the same stages again (apply the same random bit string by
XOR to the cipher text) to reconstruct the original message. The key may never be
reused. Since each bit of the cipher text depends directly on the random bit string,
the cipher text is also completely random (if the key is unknown). While this me-
thod is even very economic concerning computational power, the big problem is to
equip both parties with the key. This exchange has to be equally secure and the
communicating parties potentially need a lot of key material (for each message the
key has to be as long as the message). Since there is no method to perform this task
with information theoretic security in classical cryptography (the only possible way
is a trusted courier), the one-time pad is used very rarely.
With quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution (QKD) as it is more preci-
sely called, this gap can be filled. QKD is a method to securely generate a symmetric
random key at both parties. There exist a number of security proofs confirming the
information theoretic security. After the first QKD protocol had been published in
1984, some more protocols and first experimental demonstrations appeared in the
1990s. In the following decade, a lot of effort was spent to make QKD systems
more compatible with potential users’ demands, pushing primarily distances and
key rates. While this is still a major development goal, another important task is
being pursued for some years now, namely finding and fixing security loop holes
in the setups. Although the security proofs are not subject to doubt, they rely
on theoretic assumptions about the systems that are usually not met by real-world
implementations.
In this thesis I will report on progress on both of these frontiers, on the one hand
a QKD implementation within the EU project network SECOQC and on the other
hand a general characterization of our setup concerning realistic attacks and a spe-
cial attack that we have successfully launched on this setup as well as possible
countermeasures.
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2.1 From Classical to Quantum Cryptography
Cryptography is the art of transforming a message into some illegible clutter of let-
ters only the legitimate recipient shall be able to reconstruct. Already the ancient
Egyptians, Spartans and Romans have developed their own techniques thousands
of years ago. In more recent history, cryptographic algorithms have played impor-
tant roles in World War I and II (e.g. the ENIGMA). The common availability
of computers has boosted the potential of cryptography and its opponent crypta-
nalysis (the art of deciphering messages without being the legitimate conversation
partner) to bring it to a whole new level. Furthermore, in our more and more digital
world, sophisticated algorithms can now be used by almost anybody to secure his
transmissions.
In modern cryptography, messages are strings of bits (bit = binary digit, value
0B or 1B). During the encryption process, the message gets transformed into the
ciphertext with the help of a crypographic key. This is sent to the recipient, who
uses his key for decryption to regain the original message. There are two kinds of
cryptographic algorithms, symmetric ones where originator (usually called Alice)
and recipient (Bob) use identical keys, and asymmetric ciphers, where the keys for
encryption and decryption are different. The big advantage of asymmetric methods
is that you can deploy the key for encryption (the public key) to everyone, while
only the respective private key needs to be kept safe. This greatly simplifies the
key distribution task. The caveat, on the other hand, is that asymmetric algorithms
are based on a mathematical problem that is not proven to be hard to solve. In
effect, symmetric algorithms are the method of choice for sensitive information that
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needs to stay safe even for the next 20 or more years. With the advent of modern
information theory one realized that there is an information theoretically secure
(ITS) symmetric algorithm called one-time pad or Vernam cipher. It needs a random
key as long as the message and applies a bitwise XOR operation between those two.
The resulting ciphertext is as random as the key, but carrying out the same operation
with the identical key again reconstructs the message. So it is actually very simple to
use, whereas asymmetric algorithms usually need a lot of computational resources.
The only problem with the one-time pad is that it needs symmetric key material as
long as the ciphertext, since keys may not be reused.
As there is no known classical method of ITS key generation or key growing, the key
material for one-time pads had to be transported by trusted couriers or similarly
laborious procedures. Hence it was (and still is) used only very rarely. At the
end of the 20th century, it turned out that symmetric key distrubion was one of the
problems that could be solved by quantum information. The method discovered (see
next section) was first called quantum cryptography, but, since only a symmetric
key pair is generated quantum key distribution (QKD) is the better naming (for an
overview of the existing protocols and implementations see [1]).
In quantum information the analog of the classical bit is the quantum bit or qubit.
The corresponding Hilbert space is spanned by the two computational basis states
|0〉 and |1〉, so that a qubit state can be represented as |ψ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 with
α, β ∈ C and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. So in contrast to a classical bit the qubit can be in
any coherent superposition between the basis states, too. It can be realized as any
two-level system, like for example the spin of an electron. In the following, I will
consider qubits to be represented by the polarization of single photons.
2.2 BB84 Protocol
In 1984, Ch. Bennett and G. Brassard published the first QKD protocol [2]. Al-
though other protocols have been proposed since then, the so-called BB84 protocol
is still the basis of many modern QKD systems. One reason for that is certainly its
combination of simplicity and efficiency. It can be summarized as follows:
1. The transmitter (Alice) prepares photons randomly (and independently) in
one of the four polarization states |H〉, |V 〉, |+〉, |−〉 (horizontal, vertical, +45◦
and −45◦) and sends them to the receiver (Bob). He tries to analyse the
polarization of the individual photons, randomly choosing the basis (H/V or
+/−).
2. Bob tells Alice, which of the photons he has detected. Alice removes the rest
of the entries from her list. Both parties now share the so-called raw key which
14
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is formed as:
|H〉
|+〉
}
7→ 0B and |V 〉|−〉
}
7→ 1B (2.1)
3. Alice and Bob exchange the basis settings they used for preparation and mea-
surement, respectively. They remove those entries from their lists, where they
chose different bases. This procedure is called sifting and the resulting keys
are called sifted keys. Ideally, Alice and Bob’s sifted keys should be identical,
but eavesdropping on the quantum signals will lead to erroneous bits (see for
example section 2.2.1). Furthermore, because of experimental imperfections,
some errors will have been introduced into the keys. Usually, all existing errors
are attributed to the misdeeds of an eavesdropper (Eve).
4. During the error correction process, the non-matching bits will be identified
and corrected. For the BB84 protocol, this procedure is usually based on the
well-known two-way communication algorithm called Cascade [3]. To avoid
confusion, it should be noted that this error correction process is purely clas-
sical unlike quantum error correction protocols used e.g. in quantum compu-
tation. The error estimation allows Alice and Bob to calculate an upper limit
on the information, Eve may have gained about their keys.
During the error correction procedure, information about the key (in the form
of parity bits) is exchanged between Alice and Bob. They count the number
of disclosed bits and add them to the number of erroneous bits.
5. After error correction, Alice and Bob share (with a very high probability)
perfectly correlated keys. But since some information may have leaked to
a potential eavesdropper (due to an actual attack on the qubits or due to
listening to the error correction communication), the legitimate parties can
reduce Eve’s knowledge about the resulting key by a classical method called
privacy amplification [4, 5] to an arbitrarily low value. It basically uses so-
called universal2 hash functions [6] that scramble the keys maximally while at
the same time shrinking them. More information about the shrinking factor
will be provided in section 2.2.2.
The (classical) communication between Alice and Bob needs not be encrypted, but
definitely authenticated to rule out complete man-in-the-middle attacks (see e.g.
section 5.2.6). Thus for ITS authentication [7], the legitimate parties inevitably
need some pre-shared secret. This is why quantum key distribution is sometimes
also called quantum secret growing. While the need for authentication was already
explicitly mentioned in the original publication [2], steps 4 and 5 have been developed
later. Especially the method of privacy amplification is still extended to include
more and more imperfections of real systems. This will be discussed further in later
sections and chapters.
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2.2.1 A Simple Attack
As a simple illustration for the origin of this security advantage, the so-called
intercept-resend attack can be regarded: The general setting is that Eve has cut
the quantum channel between Alice and Bob, analyzes the photons sent from Bob
and sends the state to Alice that she has measured. Suppose Alice sends an |H〉
state and Bob has his analyzer set to the H/V basis (otherwise the event will be
discarded during sifting). Now, if Eve measures the polarization in the H/V basis,
too, she will find |H〉 and transmit |H〉 again and Bob will measure |H〉, too. Eve
will know the bit, she will not have introduced an error. In 50 % of the cases, Eve
will, however, set her analyzer to the +/− basis. Then her measurement outcome
is random and she will transmit |+〉 or |−〉. Bob’s result will now be random, too,
and in 50 % of those cases (so in total in 25 % of all cases), he will find |V 〉, i.e.
the opposite polarization that Alice has sent. In the end, Alice and Bob will have
a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 25 %, which means they will detect Eve’s pre-
sence and discard the key. There are, of course, more sophisticated attacks, but it
has been shown (see next section) that there exists an upper bound for the amount
of information an eavesdropper could gain for a given QBER [8].
2.2.2 Security Proofs
The earlier proofs that QKD is ITS (also called unconditionally secure) [9–11] were a
great achievement. This is especially true since a little earlier it had been shown that
other quantum assisted protocols like quantum bit commitment were not secure [12].
Still, the first QKD security proofs contained some assumptions that were more or
less difficult to meet in reality. Among these were noiseless channels or quantum
computers for Alice and Bob. P. Shor and J. Preskill [13] combined ideas from
previous publications to end up with a relatively simple proof for the BB84 protocol
that only required the QBER to be below a certain threshold.
It was still assumed, however, even if that was not always explicitly mentioned, that
the transmitter should only emit a single qubit at a time and the detector should only
analyze this qubit and that it shouldn’t be possible to gain any information about
the qubit other than by measuring the chosen degree of freedom (here: polarization).
As a first major step closer to realistic systems, new proofs tackled the requirement
of ideal single photon sources in the transmitter. It was shown that the BB84 proto-
col was indeed secure against the most general attacks, even when attenuated laser
pulses were used instead of true single photon sources [8,14]. These proofs assumed
that all multiphoton (so-called tagged) emissions were abused by the eavesdrop-
per (see section 5.2.4) which imposed severe restrictions on the key rate at higher
loss factors [15]. This problem was further resolved with the so-called decoy state
extension to the protocol, described in section 6.2.7.2. It introduces laser pulses
of different intensities to tighten the bound on tagged pulses and calculates their
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influence according to [8].
It should be noted that the lack of true single photon sources was certainly not
the only, most probably not even the most dangerous gap between existing proofs
and existing QKD devices. H.-K. Lo, one of the co-authors of one of the security
proofs, and co-workers demonstrated an attack using timing as an additional degree
of freedom to show the vulnerability of a commercially sold QKD system [16]. More
information about security relevant imperfections of our QKD system will be given
in chapters 5 ff. While the aforementioned attack has also been inhibited (by the
same group) [17], it is still one of the big challenges of QKD research to bring proofs
and real QKD systems closer together [18].
2.3 Other Protocols
Of course, the BB84 protocol is not the only one that has been proposed until
now. Ch. Bennett actually invented a second one himself, the so-called B92 or two-
state protocol [19] that uses only two (non-orthogonal) states. Another noteworthy
example is the SARG protocol [20]. It’s advantage is that it is identical to BB84 on
the hardware level, but it uses a different sifting method (closer to the B92), so that
it is more robust against the photon-number splitting attack (see 5.2.4.1).
The protocols I’ve named so far have all been members of the so-called prepare-and-
measure schemes. Alice prepares the qubits, sends them to Bob, who measures them.
A second class of protocols uses a source of entangled qubits and two receivers. These
methods usually have the advantage that the source does not have to be trusted.
It’s integrity is checked as part of the protocol. The Ekert or E91 protocol [21]
uses the CHSH inequality [22] (a special type of Bell’s inequality) to verify that the
entangled state is genuine. For a test of the CHSH inequality a third basis has to be
introduced, increasing the hardware complexity. This can be omitted in the BBM
protocol [23], while still being able to detect a faulty source. It is more or less the
entangled version of BB84, using the otherwise discarded unequal basis choices for
the source check.
Then there is a conceptually different approach, the so-called continuous variable
(CV) scheme. Instead of employing the discrete variables of single photon states
as information carriers, here the continous variables of coherent states are used
[24–28]. These schemes are especially interesting for fiber communiation in the
telecommunication regime (λ ≈ 1.3 µm and λ ≈ 1.5 µm), since (in this wavelength
region) problematic single photon detectors are not needed.
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3.1 Overview
In this part I would like to give an overview over the achievements of the EU project
SECOQC (Development of a Global Network for SEcure COmmunication based on
Quantum Cryptography) [29], that was carried out by 41 research and industrial or-
ganizations from the EU, Switzerland and Russia between April 2004 and October
2008. While in the beginning, many different approaches to QKD and QKD sys-
tems were pursued, later the main tasks were to bring together the different QKD
techniques and systems to form a network that supplies secure cryptographic key
pairs to any two of its nodes.
3.1.1 Goal: Integrated Network
QKD systems that have been demonstrated so far are usually point-to-point links,
i.e. they connect two parties directly. One could argue that this is really exactly
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Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
QKD
Link
QKD
Link
QKD
Link
QKD
Link
Figure 3.1: Hop-by-hop message transport from node 1 to node 5 with only point-to-
point links in between. In the trusted repeater scenario, each transmit-
ting node encrypts the message with a key it shares with the receiving
node which then decrypts the message again.
what one needs, since whenever two parties want to communicate privately, they
would just need one of these links. But as soon as there are more than two parties,
and anyone might want to communicate with anyone else, the effort involved in
setting up individual links between each pair of members scales (asymptotically)
quadratically with the number of participants. This problem had to be solved before
in similar situations, e.g. with telephones or computers and the usual solution is
to build network structures so that everyone is connected to everyone else, but not
necessarily by a direct link.
It is important to note that the network discussed here was planned (and implemen-
ted) as a means to generate and distribute ITS keys. It was not, however, meant to
provide secure communication services. Nevertheless, for demonstration purposes,
the QKD network was extended by some applications that made use of the key.
3.1.2 Trusted Repeaters vs. Quantum Channel Switching
Unlike in classical connections, QKD links are necessarily point-to-point in the sense
that unknown quantum signals cannot be distributed (identically) to different par-
ties. Yet, there are two conceptually different ways of interconnecting the specific
point-to-point links to form a network: One possibility is to switch the path of the
qubits to direct them to their final destination. This is called quantum channel
switching (QCS). The other option (the one used in the SECOQC project) is that
of the trusted repeater (TR). Here, secrets are generated by QKD between the par-
ties sharing a direct QKD link, but then these secrets can be transported securely
over a classical network in a so-called hop-by-hop fashion (see Fig. 3.1). Each node
takes the key that shall be transmitted to a distant node, plus an authorization tag,
encrypts both with a one-time pad using a key it shares with the next node in line
and sends it there. The latter node decrypts it, checks the authentication tag and
uses the same procedure to transfer it to the next node on the route.
Both methods have advantages and drawbacks, some of which shall be briefly dis-
cussed here:
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• The main disadvantage of the TR scenario is that all of the nodes (that contri-
bute to the key transport) have to be trusted (hence the name), as they have
direct access to the secret key. This might or might not be a knock-out cri-
terion, depending on whether the communicating parties can trust the QKD
network provider, perhaps because it’s all one and the same organization. This
constraint does not apply to the case of QCS, here only the endpoints have to
be regarded secure (which is generally always the case).
• One advantage of the TR model is that it extends the range of QKD secured
communication channels even with todays technology. While it consumes a
lot of key material, there is no technical problem with a lot of hops. In QCS
networks, quantum repeaters could overcome current distance limitations, but
they are still not available for such purposes. As long as that does not change,
QCS is restricted to the distance which can be achieved with a single link.
• Another advantage of the TR system is that the networks can be composed
of different link techniques, while that is (at least in general) difficult for
the QCS approach. The benefit is that depending on the circumstances the
optimal method can be used in the TR case for each link. Today different
techniques seem to be promising for different scenarios: Various fiber systems
would probably be used when the distance is some tens of km (providing fibers
can be deployed), while for short ranges and very long ones (with the help of
satellites), as well as for mobile applications, free space links might be the
better option.
• There is one more major difference between the two types of networks: While
they both need pre-shared secrets with their next neighbors for authentication
purposes, TR nodes only have a few next neighbors, whereas for QCS nodes
every other node is a direct link partner, so that the amount of pre-shared
secrets that has to be deployed at installation time scales quadratically with
the number of nodes. A large network of this type would certainly become
more difficult to manage.
Summarizing these arguments, with todays technology (i.e. without practical quan-
tum repeaters) and under the assumption that all nodes are trustworthy, the TR
type of network is favorable compared to the QCS idea and was hence implemented
in the SECOQC network.
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Figure 3.2: Schematic drawing of a SECOQC node.
3.2 Architecture and Topology
3.2.1 Nodes: Providing Classical Functionality
The classical functionality of the TR nodes of the network has to enable several
requirements. Not only should they support the classical communication required for
QKD methods, they should furthermore carry out the whole key transport service,
including routing and ITS authentication, encryption/ decryption of transported
key material as well as its management and storage. A schematic drawing of two
nodes is shown in Fig. 3.2.
Each node contains a so-called node module and at least one QKD device. Usually,
stand-alone QKD devices use a more or less direct classical channel for sifting, er-
ror correction, privacy amplification and authentication of all the classical messages
involved in these procedures. In the SECOQC network, all classical communication
was routed through the node modules and the authentication was taken over by
them, too. This was decided, firstly since the node modules were to take care of
the key management and ITS authentication needs fresh keys from time to time
and secondly because authentication works the same regardless of the actual QKD
method implemented in the specific device. This is not true for sifting, error correc-
tion and privacy amplification, hence this was left in the responsibility of the QKD
devices. When the device has processed a certain amount of key material and got
confirmation from the node module that all implicated messages were authentic, the
key is pushed to the node module for further use.
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Figure 3.3: Topology of the SECOQC network in Vienna. The node STP was lo-
cated near St. Po¨lten, approximately 50 km West of Vienna, this and
the nodes BRT (Breitenfurterstrasse), SIE (Siemensstrasse), GUD (Gu-
drunstrasse), ERD (Erdberger La¨nde) are part of the Siemens Austria
fiber communication network. The node FOR (Siemens Forum) was not
connected to the network by fiber, but the public demonstration took
place there, so our free space link was used to bridge the gap.
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3.2.2 SECOQC Network Topology in Vienna
The QKD network demonstrator was set up in the Vienna area in 2008. Four nodes
of a fiber network ring in Vienna were provided at Siemens Austria branches: One
at Breitenfurterstrasse (BRT), one at Siemensstrasse (SIE), one at Gudrunstrasse
(GUD) and one at Erdberger La¨nde (ERD) (see Fig. 3.3). These nodes were not
only connected by a dedicated (dark) fiber each to their neighbors in the ring, but
also ”diagonally”. Since there was no direct connection between BRT and ERD or
SIE and GUD, this was done by directly connecting one fiber from SIE and one
from GUD at BRT and the same at ERD. Hence the ”diagonals” are as long as the
(shorter) sums of the respective edges.
In addition to the fiber ring, there was one fiber connection to a telecommunication
facility near St. Po¨lten (STP), about 50 km West of Vienna. The fiber link from
BRT to STP, totaling 85 km, was the longest one in the network.
Just across the road from ERD there is the Siemens Forum (FOR), were the public
demonstration was held in October 2008. To connect this building to the SECOQC
network, our free space system was set up on the roofs of ERD and FOR. The
results of that will be discussed in the next chapter. I will now summarize the other
QKD systems that were used in the network.
3.3 QKD Point to Point Links
3.3.1 idQ: Autocompensating Plug&Play System
Three of the QKD point to point links were equipped with variations of ID Quan-
tique’s commercially available QKD system called “Cerberis”. They are based on
the so-called plug and play autocompensating design [30, 31] (see Fig. 3.4): There,
a strong laser pulse (λ = 1550 nm) is sent from Bob to Alice after passing through
an unbalanced interferometer, with a polarization rotation by 90◦ in the long arm.
At Alice the pulse is reflected at a Faraday mirror (FM), then some phase shift is
applied (PM1) to encode the quantum state, the pulse is attenuated strongly (VA)
according to the measured intensity on the calibration detector (CD) and returned
to Bob. He can set a certain phase (PM2) in one arm of his interferometer and
analyze the state with a single photon detector each at the output (D1, D2). Since
one of the beam splitters of Bob’s interferometer is a polarizing one (PBS) and all
fibers inside Bob are polarization maintaining, both pulses take the same path and
together with the Faraday mirror this compensates for the otherwise possibly pro-
blematic polarization changes in the fibers. The circulator (C) makes sure that the
pulses from the laser are directed towards Alice while the photons from Alice hit
the single photon detector. At Alice, the phase modulator (PM1) and the variable
attenuator (VA) are controlled by a PC, at Bob the phase (PM2) is set by another
PC.
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Figure 3.4: Schematic drawing of the autocompensating plug & Play QKD system
from ID Quantique. The (bright) pulses from laser (L) are fed into
an unbalanced interferometer formed by a beam splitter (BS2) and a
polarizing beam splitter (PBS). All fibers are polarization maintaining
and since the polarization in the longer (i.e. upper) arm is rotated by
90◦, all the light exits the interferometer in the same port. At Alice, the
pulses are reflected on the Faraday mirror (FM), their phase is modified
(PM1) and they are attenuated (VA) to the single photon level according
to the intensity on the calibration detector (CD). Then they return to
Bob where they are analyzed in his interferometer relative to the phase
setting of PM2.
Two protocols, BB84 and SARG [15,20] could be performed with these setups. The
advantage of the SARG protocol is that – while keeping it secure against photon-
number splitting attacks – it is less sensitive to losses than the standard BB84. In
low loss situations, however, it produces less secure key than BB84. Hence it was
implemented in the longer link from BRT to ERD. The links from BRT to GUD
and GUD to SIE were used with the BB84 protocol. The link between BRT and
ERD produced about 1 kbit/s secure key.
A similar system from ID Quantique was employed to securely transport the ballot
counts in several Swiss elections, including the national election in 2007.
3.3.2 COW: Coherent One Way System
The link between BRT and STP was fitted with a coherent one way system (COW)
developed by the University of Geneva [32–34]. In the COW QKD protocol, qubits
are encoded in time (see Fig. 3.5). Alice prepares mutually coherent laser pulses
at certain time slots, and at each time slot, the intensity can be 0 or µ < 1. A
binary 0B corresponds to a sequence (0, µ) and a binary 1B to (µ, 0), but there are
also decoy pulses with sequence (µ, µ). Bob mostly measures the time of arrival of
photons on the data detector DB. Some fraction of pulses (here: 10 %), however is
reflected at a beam splitter to pass an unbalanced interferometer with a path length
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Figure 3.5: Schematic drawing of the COW setup. The attenuated laser pulses ori-
ginating from Laser L are intensity modulated (intensity modulator IM)
and sent towards Bob. The first (biased) beam splitter (BS) is used
to decide whether a pulse is used for key bit generation or a coherence
check. In the first case, the timing information of events at detector DB
is analyzed. In the latter case the interferometer is set such that detector
DM2 should not click if two consecutive non-empty pulses arrive there.
Hence, detector DM1 can be omitted for convenience.
difference equal to the time delay between two consecutive pulses. At its outputs,
there are monitor detectors. These are used to check the level of coherence between
consecutive non-empty pulses (i.e. in decoy pulses or (0B, 1B) sequences), which is a
measure for the estimation of a potential eavesdroppers knowledge. To this end, the
timing information of detection events in detector DM2 are transmitted to Alice. The
detector should never fire in those cases where two consecutive non-empty pulses
arrive at the interferometer.
A brief description of the protocol:
1. Alice sends pulses to Bob, with the following probabilities: Bit 0B, 1B: p(0B) =
p(1B) = (1− f)/2, decoy pulses p((µ, µ)) = f .
2. Bob reports the time of the detection events in detectors DB and DM2.
3. Alice announces which of the raw key bits have to be removed due to decoy
states.
4. Alice calculates Eve’s information from the number of detections in DM2.
5. Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy amplification.
The system is immune to PNS attacks, since acting on individual photons is generally
detected. The decoy pulses were introduced to catch coherent attacks on consecutive
pulses. However, it has to be noted that a complete security proof so far does not
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Figure 3.6: Schematic drawing of the TOSH setup. The attenuated pulses origina-
ting from a laser (L) are intensity modulated (IM) and pass through an
unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer with a phase modulator (PM1)
in one arm. One of the outputs is attenuated (VA) and connected to
Bob. There (unlike in the idQ setup) the birefringence effects of the fi-
ber between Alice and Bob have to compensated (PC), before the pulses
are analyzed by a second Mach-Zehnder interferometer and two single
photon detectors (D1, D2).
exist and because of the very different approach, existing proofs of other QKD
schemes seem to be difficult to adapt.
While in some different experiments [33, 34] such systems were equipped with su-
perconducting single photon detectors, in this case free running InGaAs APDs [35]
have been employed. The secure key rate was measured to be about 600 bit/s with
a QBER between 3 % and 5 % over the substantial distance of 82 km optical fiber.
3.3.3 TOSH: One Way Weak Pulse System
Toshiba Research Europe Ltd contributed a one way weak pulse QKD link [36] to
the network. It was based on a decoy-state extended BB84 protocol with phase
encoding (see Fig. 3.6). Alice sends laser pulses through an asymmetric Mach-
Zehnder interferometer with a phase modulator in one arm to prepare the qubits
and Bob uses a similar interferometer with two APDs at the outputs to analyze
them. Since unlike the systems from ID Quantique, here the pulses are sent directly
from Alice to Bob, polarization changes in the fibers have to be compensated for
actively.
The system was installed between the nodes BRT and SIE with a distance of 32 km.
It yielded 3.1 kbit/s of secure key averaged over a period of 24 hours at a QBER of
2.6 %.
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Figure 3.7: Schematic drawing of the basic ENT setup. The entangled photon source
(EPS) at Alice emits photon pairs with one photon at λ1 = 810 nm
and its partner photon at λ2 = 1550 nm. The first one is directed
to a local free space polarization measurement apparatus (consisting of
polarization controller PC1, beam splitter BS, polarizing beam splitters
PBSHV and PBS± and the four single photon detectors DA1 to DA4. The
longer wavelength photon is sent through the external fiber to Bob’s
setup, which is very similar to the one at Alice. The main difference
is that here the components are fiber based and designed for 1550 nm.
There are two polarization controllers (PC2, PC3), a fiber beam splitter
(FBS), two polarizing fiber beam splitters (FPBS1, FPBS2) and four
InGaAs APDs (DB1 to DB4).
3.3.4 ENT: Entangled Photon Pair System
The link between SIE and ERD was provided in a joint action by the University of
Vienna, the Austrian Institute of Technology and the Royal Institute of Technology
of Kista in Sweden. The system [37] (see Fig. 3.7) is based on a down conversion
source producing entangled photon pairs at non-degenerate wavelengths (one photon
at λ = 810 nm, the other one at λ = 1550 nm). The polarization of the first one
is measured locally, so that the transmitter part acts as a heralded single photon
source with one of four randomly chosen polarizations. The output photons are
coupled into the fiber and sent to Bob, who is equipped with a similar single photon
polarization analyzer. In this system, Alice and Bob use the BBM protocol [23],
which is effectively an entangled photon version of the BB84. It offers security
without the need of measuring a Bell inequality like in the protocol proposed by
Ekert [21], nevertheless remaining secure against tempering with the source.
The entangled photon source contains two nonlinear crystals (PPKTP) in type-I col-
linear phasematching, pumped by a cw laser at λ = 532 nm, yielding a trigger count
rate of up to 1.5 MHz at 14 mW pump power. For the SECOQC demonstration,
it was run at 6 mW pump power, resulting in 750 kHz trigger rate, a coincidence
count rate at Bob of 8 kHz and a secure key rate of 2.5 kbit/s. The visibility was
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Figure 3.8: Schematic drawing of the CV setup. At Alice, a laser (L) pulse at
λ = 1550 nm is split up by a 99:1 beam splitter (BS1) into a strong local
oscillator (bottom) and a weak signal pulse (top) and both parts are po-
larized (P). The signal pulse is phase or amplitude modulated (APM1),
delayed and further attenuated (VA), then both pulses are combined
into one spatial mode by a polarizing beam splitter (PBS1) and sent to
Bob. There, after polarization compensation (PC), the pulses are split
up again by PBS2. Now the local oscillator part passes a phase modu-
lator (PM1) to select which quadrature is measured and delayed to be
overlapped with the signal pulse at BS2 in a homodyne detection.
on average 93 % and hence the QBER about 3.5 %.
3.3.5 CV: Continuous Variable System
The last long-distance QKD link set up in Vienna was developed by a collaboration
of Laboratoire Charles Fabry de l’Institut d’Optique, THALES Research and Tech-
nology France and Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, connecting the nodes GUD and
ERD. In contrast to all previously described systems, this one does not employ qu-
bit encoding of photons detected by single photon detectors. Here the information
is conveyed via the two quadratures (amplitude and phase) of the electromagne-
tic field of a coherent state [25]. This method is called continuous variable (CV)
QKD. To prepare her signal, Alice splits off a small fraction of a laser pulse (pulse
length 100 ns, repetition rate 500 kHz, wavelength 1550 nm), phase or amplitude
modulates it and delays it. The strong and the weak pulse are (both time and po-
larization multiplexed) sent to Bob who de-multiplexes the two pulses and overlaps
them on a beam splitter, performing a so-called homodyne detection of one of the
two quadratures using PIN photodiodes. To evaluate the knowledge of an eaves-
dropper, the noise level is compared to the shot-noise limit. Unlike with previously
discussed systems, the performance of CV systems can be significantly improved
by sophisticated error correction algorithms. In this case, a method called reverse
reconciliation [38,39] was used to distill a key from the measurement values.
The system yielded a secret key rate of 8 kbit/s over a period of 57 h of continuous
29
3 SECOQC Network
operation over the link distance of 6.2 km.
3.3.6 FS: Last Mile Free Space QKD System
Our free space QKD system was used to bridge the gap between the closest one of
fiber nodes (ERD) and the FOR building, where the public demonstration was held.
A more detailed description of our system will be given in the following chapter.
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Our free space QKD system uses the polarization of strongly attenuated laser pulses
to run the BB84 protocol with decoy state extension [40]. I will now describe the
system in more detail1:
4.1 Transmitter Optics
The transmitter’s task is to prepare faint laser pulses at the four necessary polariza-
tions (H, V,+45◦,−45◦), with three possible intensities each (µV = 0, µS, µD). The
intensity classes, called vacuum, signal and decoy states, are essential for the decoy
state protocol extension of BB84. In principle this could be realized in different
ways. For instance, one could use one laser, switch the attenuation and rotate the
polarization from pulse to pulse. On a different approach, we are using eight laser
diodes, one set oriented at the four polarizations driven with intensity µS and ano-
ther set driven at µD. For vacuum pulses, no diode is activated. This method is (at
least at first glance) technically easier to set up, while there are some disadvantages,
1Results of our free space QKD system partly related to this chapter have been presented in
SECOQC and QAP project reports as well as in [29,41,42].
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Figure 4.1: Schematic drawing of our free space QKD system as used in the SE-
COQC demonstration at Vienna in Autumn of 2008. In the Alice head,
the beams from 8 laser diodes are combined into a piece of single mode
fiber (SMF) for spatial mode filtering. The polarization controller (PC)
is there to undo the polarization rotation introduced by the fiber. A
non-polarizing beam splitter (BS) reflects a fraction of the beams onto a
single photon detector (SPD) for mean photon number calibration. The
transmitted part of the beam passes Alice’s telescope (lenses f1 and f2).
After free space propagation of 80 m, the beam is picked up by Bob’s
telescope (f3 and f4) and has to pass a spectral (IF) and spatial filter
(SF) before being measured by the single photon polarization analyzer
(Bob Module).
too. The major drawbacks originate from the fact that the pulses from the two
sets of laser diodes should ideally only differ in polarization. The resulting security
implications will be discussed in chapter 5.
The beams of the eight laser diodes (wavelength λ = 850 nm) are combined by some
specially shaped mirrors into a spatial filter (SMF, see Fig. 4.1). In this case, we used
a short piece of single mode optical fiber that was temperature stabilized so that the
main source for stress induced birefringence changes was eliminated. At the output
of the fiber, a polarization controller was mounted to undo the polarization rotation
introduced by the fiber. After that the beam passed a non-polarizing beam splitter
(BS), where a part of the beam was reflected into a single photon detector (SPD) for
monitoring and control of the mean photon numbers per pulse. In the transmitted
arm there was a shutter (S) next, which could be closed while the mean photon
numbers were calibrated, in order to prevent stray light from hitting the SPD.
Finally two lenses with f1 = −15 mm and f2 = 50 mm formed a telescope to direct
the light towards Bob.
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4.2 Receiver Optics
The receiver’s telescope constituted an f3 = 310 mm and an f4 = −15 mm lens to
collimate the incoming beam, which then had to pass through a spatial filter that was
formed by two f = 30 mm lenses with a d = 150 µm pinhole in between. The beam
was then focused by an f = 150 mm lens into the Bob module, after undergoing
spectral filtering by an interference filter (IF) of width 3 nm (FWHM). By narrowing
the spectral transmission and the field of view to less than 200 µrad the system got
close to being operational during daylight. Another important ingredient towards
this goal was to shield off as much stray light as possible. The surface of Alice’s
box facing towards Bob was painted black and a black tube was used around Alice’s
telescope to suppress stray light hitting her exit lens.
4.3 Support Electronics
The 8 laser diodes in the Alice head were controlled by a custom made short pulse
(FWHM < 1 ns) laser diode driver, connected to a PC through a PCI interface.
The PC used prepared files from a quantum random number generator (QRNG) to
determine basis, bit value and the pulse class (signal, decoy or empty).
At the receiver, when a photon hit one of the SPDs of the Bob module, it delivered a
NIM signal that was fed into a home-made timetagging unit. This recorded the time
of arrival of the detection events and which detector they appeared in and handed
this over to a PC.
In order to be able to adjust the pointing direction of Alice’s and Bob’s telescopes,
both optics parts were mounted on tip-tilt stages, equipped with stepper motors
which were controlled by the two PCs.
4.4 Software
4.4.1 Synchronization
Since Alice and Bob only had their simple local and uncorrelated clock generators the
synchronization of the transmission/ detection events was implemented in software.
Bob basically used the arrival time of the detection events to find and maintain
the 10 MHz repetition rate of the transmitter. A (software gating) time window
of 3 ns (total width) was applied around the expected signal detection events, in
order to filter background events with an attenuation of more than 15 dB. Thus the
contribution of background events (especially during the day) on the QBER was
reduced substantially.
Furthermore, this process assigned a pulse number to each detection event inside the
time window. Due to the potentially different starting times of Alice and Bob (these
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time differences were not known a priori), there was an offset between their pulse
number assignments. To find this offset, pseudorandom sequences were introduced in
the photon stream (encoded in the intensity rather than polarization). By analysing
these, Bob was able to infer the start time difference within a period of some 100 ms.
NTP synchronization of the PC clocks was sufficient to determine this remaining
parameter. Further information can be found in [41,42].
4.4.2 Sifting, Error Correction and Privacy Amplification
After successful synchronization, Alice and Bob have agreed on a common pulse
number reference. Then, in the sifting process, Bob told Alice, in which pulse slots
he has detected photons. Alice removed the other entries from her list and both
discarded the cases where they had chosen different bases. The resulting sifted keys
were supposed to be equal on both sides, except for some (quantum) bit errors.
These could result from imperfections of the setup or from the presence of an eaves-
dropper. To be on the safe side, they were attributed to a potential eavesdropper.
For error correction, Alice and Bob used the Cascade protocol [3] with a slight modi-
fication: In order to make the communication more efficient, the process was applied
to several parts of the key in parallel (otherwise there is only one bit transferred
over the network, whith a giant protocol overhead). At the end of a protocol run,
Alice and Bob shared the same key (with very high probability) and they have cal-
culated the QBER and the amount of information on the key that has been made
public during error correction. All this was handed over to the privacy amplification
process.
The privacy amplification process [4, 5] calculated the amount of information, a
potential eavesdropper could have gained from the values listed above. With a decoy
state protocol extension, more values (like the different mean photon numbers and
the corresponding detection probabilities) have to be included in this calculation.
The error corrected key then was shrunk by the calculated value using Toeplitz
matrices as universal hash functions [6, 7].
4.4.3 Authentication
It is important to note that without proper authentication, QKD systems are sus-
ceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. Hence, a pre-shared secret between QKD
link partners is vital as a necessary requirement for authentication.
In the SEOCQC network demonstration (see Chapter 3), authentication of the com-
munication (all messages sent during operation (pointing, sifting, error correction
and privacy amplification)) was provided by the node modules. For standalone ope-
ration, our QKD system is provided with its own authentication module. Different
methods can be used, but for QKD unconditionally secure authentication introdu-
ced by Wegman and Carter [7] is usually preferred. In short, it works like this: Each
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message is run through a universal hash function [6] that is known only by the two
legitimate parties (it hence serves as a pre-shared secret). The output of the hash
function (some tens of bits) is encrypted with a one-time-pad and sent to the other
party as an authentication tag. The receiver checks the tag by performing the same
procedure and comparing the result. Since each authentication process needs fresh
key, our system does not authenticate each message individually, but rather all the
messages belonging to a part of the final key. For many hash functions it is even
possible to take advantage of this technique without having to save the complete
messages. Rather they can be fed into the hash function along the way, so that the
memory requirements are hardly increased.
4.4.4 Automatic Telescope Alignment
The setups are usually subjected to substantial temperature changes. These have a
strong influence on the pointing direction and thus on the alignment and coupling
efficiency between Alice’s and Bob’s telescope. This results in a dramatic decrease
of signal count rate after a few hours. As a countermeasure we have mounted the
telescopes on tip-tilt stages equipped with stepper motors. A piece of software runs
on Bob’s PC that only uses the current signal count rate as input to control the
alignment. The algorithm uses a method similar to the lock-in technique, in order
to maximize the signal counting rate by applying small changes to the pointing
direction of both telescopes and by evaluation of the corresponding count rates.
Like the lock-in technique, it is insensitive to fluctuations at comparatively high
frequencies. The control bandwidth is on the order of some tens of mHz, since
we only want to compensate for slow thermal drifts. More information is available
from [41,42].
4.4.5 Decoy State Protocol Extension
The system is designed to use a decoy state extension [40] to the original BB84
protocol in order for it to become more robust against photon number splitting
(PNS) attacks.
Unfortunately, during the setup period of the SECOQC trial, we noticed that the
different mean photon numbers per pulse (µs = 0.3, µd = 0.35) were not sufficiently
stable for running the decoy state protocol. We therefore were forced to work without
decoy states, so that we do not claim that the experiment was robust against PNS
attacks.
4.4.6 Location
Our setup was installed as the link between the nodes FOR and ERD (see Fig. 3.3) at
the SECOQC network demonstration in Autumn of 2008. The public demonstration
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Figure 4.2: Images of the site where our QKD link was installed in Vienna. Left:
The bird’s eye view on the positions of transmitter and receiver. Right:
View from Alice to Bob with an alignment laser switched on.
took place at Siemens Forum (FOR), so that our link bridged the last mile (in fact
a little less) to the closest fiber node. Alice and Bob were placed on two buildings
with a distance of about 80 m between transmitter and receiver. While this is not
a lot, it shows one of the possible use cases of free space QKD systems, the secure
connection of different buildings in rather close proximity.
4.4.7 Results
During the preparation for the SECOQC demonstration event, the system was conti-
nuously adapted to make it daylight operable. The last enhancements were painting
the front of the transmitter box black (see Fig. 4.3) and shading the external lens
of the transmitter telescope by a 25 cm long black tube.
The field of view of the receiver was measured by scanning its pointing direction
over a small light bulb that was inserted into the transmitter box and also used for
coarse alignment of both telescopes. Figure 4.4 shows the result, the acceptance
angle was smaller than 0.01 arcsec, corresponding to an area at the transmitter of
less than 15 mm in diameter.
With those modifications the system was running during September and October
2008, occasionally interrupted by service or bad weather (e.g. dense fog) periods.
The data shown in Fig. 4.5, were taken during a cloudless day in late September
over a time span of a bit less than 36 hours. The raw count rate varied from
roughly 100 kHz at night (during rather poor transmission conditions because of high
humidity) to almost 300 kHz during the day. We measured a peak background count
rate after spatial and spectral filtering of around 100 kHz during bright daylight,
which was still in a reasonable range in order not to saturate the detectors including
the signal rate. After applying a 3 ns timewindow (at a repetition rate of 10 MHz),
the background rate contributed about 1 % to the QBER.
36
4.4 Software
-150 -100 -50  0  50  100  150
x/mm
-150
-100
-50
 0
 50
 100
 150
y
/ m
m
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
 60000
 70000
 80000
c
o
u
n
t s
 i
n
 1
0
0
 m
s
Figure 4.3: The left part shows a photograph of the box that contained the trans-
mitter. The front surface was painted black and the telescope front lens
was shaded of by a 25 cm long black tube so that as little light as possible
was reflected from the important area towards the receiver. On the right
there is a scan of the detector over roughly the same area that is shown
in the left image, yet here the number of detection events of the receiver
module are shown. One can also see the light from the small light bulb
left of the transmitter telescope that was used as an alignment help.
Even with a rather strongly fluctuating signal rate, the sifted key rate stayed more or
less constant at an average of about 40 kbit/s. This was mainly due to a limitation of
our communication software, which was resolved only after the trial, unfortunately.
The sifted key contained bit errors between 2 % and 3 %, the average was 2.3 %.
After the correction, a final key was distilled with an average rate of approximately
14 kbit/s (over this period).
It should be mentioned again that due to stability problems with the electronics,
we could not run the decoy state protocol and hence the QKD run can’t be clai-
med to have been secure against PNS attacks. Additional information about the
performance of the system can be found in [29].
Time Span Counting Rate Sifted Key Rate Secure Key Rate QBER
> 24 h 100 .. 300 kHz 40 kbit/s (av.) 14 kbit/s (av.) 2.3 % (av.)
Table 4.1: Results of the measurement run from September 26th till September
27th, 2008, of our free space QKD system at the SECOQC demonstration
experiment. Data were taken on a sunny day and the following night.
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Figure 4.4: A scan of the receiver pointing direction over a small light bulb close to
the transmitter telescope to determine the field of view. The area from
which photons are accepted by the detectors is less than 15× 10 mm2.
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Figure 4.5: Results of a free space QKD run lasting about 36 hours altogether. The
system recalibrated itself every 15 minutes, during those periods no key
was produced. One can observe a significant increase in raw count rate
during the day, but the sifted key rate is not so much affected, neither
is the QBER. This is mainly due to very rigid temporal, spatial and
spectral filtering.
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In order to take a systematic approach at a security analysis of our system, here I’ve
tried to work along the so-called Common Criteria (CC) [43–45]1. They have been
developed as an international standard for certification of security related informa-
tion technology systems. I have tried to omit some formally necessary, but in my
opinion negligible parts of the CC, e.g. the so-called “security objectives”. I want
to state clearly that the present work is not meant as a formal security target (ST),
intended for evaluation in a certification process. Instead, it is a first attempt to
systematically collect potentially security relevant properties of our system. Some
of these properties will be applicable to other systems, while others may not. The
following lists are not claimed to be exhaustive, but to my knowledge they cover the
known problems and solutions.
Even if I do not use the complete formalism, I will mainly stick to the language of
the CC. For example, I will call our QKD system “target of evaluation (TOE)”.
The structure of an ST can be briefly described as follows: It usually starts with
an introduction that includes formalities like a unique ST identification and confor-
mance claims with so-called protection profiles (PPs), which describe classes of sys-
tems rather than a single one. This introduction is formally followed by the TOE
description, that has been omitted here since it is covered by chapter 4. The part
called “TOE Security Environment” is composed of a list of assumptions (5.1) –
e.g. that nobody has physical access to the TOE –, some elaboration of the pos-
sible threats (5.2) and the so-called organisational security policiess (OSPs). The
next section in formal STs is called “Security Objectives”, describing what the TOE
should provide security against. They have been omitted here, because each Security
Objective would just have negated a threat that was listed before. The following
part called “Security Functional Requirements (SFR)” deals with the security func-
tions that are implemented to achieve the Security Objectives. In the present work
the SFR answer directly to the threats.
5.1 Assumptions
The security analysis of the TOE is based on the following assumptions:
5.1.1 Quantum Mechanics: A.01
The basic postulates of standard quantum mechanics (e.g. [46]) are assumed to
be correct. They imply fundamental principles like the no-cloning-theorem or the
indistinguishability of non-orthogonal states, thus leading to the provable security
of quantum key distribution (in connection with an authentic classical channel).
1Chapter 5 and 6 represent the outcome of a continued effort that started as a project called
“SiAnQCS” with the German Bundesamt fu¨r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI). Some
of the results shown here were presented in the corresponding project reports.
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5.1.2 Protected Area: A.02
It is assumed that the TOE is used inside a secured area. The adversary may have
physical access to the classical and quantum channel outside the secured area. This
means that there exists a restricted area, inside which the adversary is not capable
of placing massive objects like sensors of any sort. It includes the impossibility of
tempering with the power supply of the TOE.
5.1.3 OS/ Third Party Software Security: A.03
Within the scope of this document it will have to be assumed that the used third
party programs like operating system and SSL implementation are secure. It is
attempted to keep the use of third party software as limited as possible. In future
versions of the TOE a lot of tasks that are performed by third party software now
will be integrated in dedicated hard-/ software.
5.1.4 Independence of Side Channels: A.04
In the analysis of side channels, it will be assumed that the different side channels
are independent of each other2.
5.1.5 Neglection of Collective and Coherent Attacks: A.05
Within the scope of this document, it will be assumed that only individual attacks
are performed, i.e. attacks on single qubits only3.
5.2 Threats
5.2.1 Assets
The main goal of the TOE is the secure generation of symmetrical secret keys
between the two parties that are connected via the TOE. The keys are required to
be safely usable for any cryptographic method, including encryption of redundant
information4.
2The advantage of this assumption is that each side channel can be tackled separately, while
otherwise they would have to be evaluated as a whole. It is possible that some side channels
are correlated and the eavesdropper might be able to gain more information by using those
correlations.
3Since collective and coherent attacks are usually even more difficult to perform than individual
attacks, most of the theoretically proposed eavesdropping attacks on the quantum channel are
individual attacks, this is especially true for implementation specific attacks.
4Redundant plain text can help the eavesdropper gather information about the key when the
latter is reused.
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5.2.2 Threat Agents
• A possible adversary (with substantial expertise, standard equipment for the
classical channel and extraordinary expertise and equipment that is already
available today or may be available within the time the TOE may be used (e.g.
the next 10 years) 5) to listen on the classical channel and actively eavesdrop
on the physical quantum channel.
• Different threats could arise from a hacker (with substantial expertise, stan-
dard equipment), trying to compromise the system by attacking the classical
channel.
• The malfunction of some parts of the system might lead to a corruption of the
integrity of the key generation process.
5.2.3 Direct Attacks on Ideal Quantum Channel: TQ.01
Attacks on the ideal quantum channel6 are those that can be carried out theoretically
against the ideal quantum key distribution protocol BB84 [2]. It is usually assumed
that a possible adversary may use every measure that is allowed by quantum me-
chanics, even if there is no known technology today that can accomplish this. These
attacks do not use implementation specific weaknesses like the side channels that
are reported on in the next section. These attacks usually employ some interaction
between the single photons that are used for the quantum channel and a probe that
is controlled by the eavesdropper. Many different attacks have been proposed, e.g.
there is an optimal so-called individual attack [47]. There exist security proofs for
the BB84 protocol even against the most general attacks possible [13].
5.2.4 Side Channel Attacks on Quantum Channel
Apart from attacks on the ideal quantum channel, there are some that tackle the
specific physical implementation. The following possible threats to the realisation
5Many attacks on the quantum channel require so-called quantum non demolition measurements
and/or quantum memory with properties that have not been shown in experiments, yet.
6We define an ideal quantum channel as a perfect source and a perfect detector. The source
prepares exactly the state |ψ〉 ∈ {|φ0〉 = |H〉, |φ1〉 = |V 〉, |φ2〉 = |+〉, |φ3〉 = |−〉} it wants to
transmit. These states differ only in the polarisation degree of freedom, all other degrees of
freedom are the same for all states. The detector analyses the polarisation by applying one
of the two sets of measurement operators {M0 = |φ0〉〈φ0|,M1 = |φ1〉〈φ1|} (H/V basis) or
{M2 = |φ2〉〈φ2|,M3 = |φ3〉〈φ3|} (+/− basis). The probability of an occurence of measurement
outcome i provided an input state |φj〉 is pij = |〈φi|φj〉|2. The adversary may, however, do
whatever is allowed by quantum mechanics to identify or change the transmitted quantum
state.
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Figure 5.1: Attack tree
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used in this specific TOE have been identified. There are also security proofs taking
into account several experimental imperfections of QKD systems [8, 14]. This class
of attacks is divided into those resulting from a non-ideal implementation of the
transmitter and the receiver respectively.
5.2.4.1 Attacks due to imperfections on Transmitter side
The first class of attacks is enabled by possible shortcomings in the design/ realiza-
tion of the transmitter module.
TI.A01: Spectral Overlap of Transmitted Photons There are eight laser diodes
in the transmitter module (so-called Alice Module). They should differ only in the
polarisation of the photons they emit, the spectra should be indistinguishable. If
this is not the case, an eavesdropper might gain information about the polarisation
of a photon by measuring the wavelength of it. The measurement would have to
be non-destructive concerning the polarisation state, which is at least theoretically
possible. Such an attack would not be noticed by the legitimate communication
partners and has hence to be considered in this class of threats.
TI.A02: Spatial Overlap of Transmitted Photons Similar to the spectral overlap,
the light emitted from all eight laser diodes has to be combined into one single optical
mode. If this is not done, an adversary can gain information about the polarisation
of a photon by measuring its lateral position. The measurement would also have to
be non-destructive concerning the polarisation state.
TI.A03: Temporal Overlap of Transmitted Photons Similar to spectral and
spatial overlap, the light pulses emitted from all eight laser diodes have to be in-
distinguishable with regard to temporal distribution. Otherwise, an eavesdropper
might gain some information about the polarisation of a photon by measuring its
time of arrival. The measurement would also have to be non-destructive concerning
the polarisation state.
TI.A04: Mean Photon Number Mismatch or Instability Similar to the attacks
mentioned before, the light pulses emitted from the two sets of four laser diodes each
have to be indistinguishable with respect to the average number of photons contained
in them. If this was not the case, information might leak to a non-authorised party.
Furthermore, these parameters have to stay constant and their absolute value has
to be in accordance with the applied theory (for privacy amplification).
TI.A05: Induced Mean Photon Number Boost or Mismatch An adversary may
try to shift the threshold of the laser diodes by shining in light from the outside.
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This could effectively induce a mean photon number mismatch or increase the mean
photon number of all laser diodes, which would - if it remained unnoticed - pose a
significant security threat.
TI.A06: Trojan Horse Attack Transmitter The adversary could try to shine light
into the transmitter unit to infer information about the state of the system. Since
there are no actively switched optical elements in the TOE, this attack is not quite
straight forward. Still, there may be ways of reading out which of the laser diodes
is activated.
TI.A07: Photon Number Splitting In the ideal protocol, a single photon source
is used to make sure that every time slot contains one photon at maximum. The
TOE uses laser pulses strongly attenuated to the single photon level. Because the
number of photons within the pulses is distributed according to the Poisson statistics,
there is a non-vanishing possibility that a pulse contains more than one photon. By
performing a so-called photon number splitting (PNS) attack, an adversary could
gain information about those photons without disturbing the qubit that is used for
key generation.
TI.A08: Correlated Radiation The TOE could emit electromagnetic radiation
into the environment or onto supply or communication lines that might be used by
an eavesdropper to gain information about the polarization of the photons or about
the key itself. The secured area has to be defined bigger than the area in which such
attacks would be possible.
TI.A09: Random Number Generation The transmitter part of the TOE contains
a random number generator that determines which of the eight laser diodes fires. If
an adversary could gain knowledge about the bit stream produced by the random
number generator, he or she would be able to predict the photons’ polarization and
hence get information about the key.
5.2.4.2 Attacks due to imperfections on Receiver side
TI.B01: Temporal Detection Efficiency Overlap The receiver module of the
TOE contains four separate single photon detectors. The delay between the arrival
time of a photon at the input of the module and the rising edge of the electronic
signal that is produced, can vary from one detector to the next. When a global time
window is applied in order to discriminate signal from background events, this leads
to an effective difference of the detection efficiency for different detectors at different
times [48,49] with two implications:
45
5 Security Analysis of our Free Space QKD System
• Passive: Depending on the arrival time of a signal photon, an eavesdropper
could determine (with some probability), which of the detectors is more likely
to register an event. This would not cause any errors. A similar attack has been
shown in [50], where the detection times were transmitted over the classical
channel for synchronization.
• Active: An attacker could use this to control the receiver module. He could
shine in light at a certain time to increase the probability that a distinct
detector registers the event [16, 51]. If Eve can do that perfectly (i.e. there
are distinct time intervals when only one detector registers the event, one
for each detector), she can completely predetermine the outcome of Bob’s
measurement, e.g. by doing an intercept-resend attack and hence produce no
error at all [52].
TI.B02: Spatial Detection Efficiency Overlap Like in the transmitter module,
the spatial modes defined by the APDs and the rest of the receiver’s optics system
might not overlap completely. This results in two different possible problems:
• Efficiency mismatch: Obviously, there might be different effective efficiencies
for different spatial modes of the signal beam. These might even change in
time if the transmitter mode (modeled as one single spatial mode now) to the
different receiver modes’ coupling efficiency is not constant.
• Further degree of freedom for a pre-pulse attack as explained in TI.B06 only
instead of using a bright light pulse with a certain polarisation, Eve could use
a bright pulse shining in with a special spatial mode. In this way, she might be
able to manipulate the efficiency of individual single photon detectors, rather
than attacking at least three detectors at a theoretically fixed ratio.
TI.B03: Spectral Detection Efficiency Overlap This liability is equivalent to
TI.B01 and TI.B02, with the distinction that the degree of freedom is spectral
efficiencies instead of spatial or temporal efficiency differences.
TI.B04: Detector Efficiency Mismatch There may be a general difference bet-
ween the efficiencies of the four detectors, but this can be covered in the same way
the previous paragraphs are handled.
TI.B05: Trojan Horse Attack Receiver The attacker could try to shine rather
bright light into the receiver unit and analyse its reflected parts to gain information
about the current internal state of the receiver. This attack is not applicable to this
TOE. There are no actively switched optical devices inside the receiver that could
be utilized for such an attack.
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TI.B06a: Detector Dead Times I This attack is covered in more detail in Chap-
ter 7. I want to summarize it briefly here:
After a state-of-the-art (ungated) single photon detector has registered a photon,
it needs some time to recover until it can detect the next one. This so-called dead
time can already be used passively to gain some knowledge about the key without
introducing additional errors [53]. Additionally, this effect can be employed to attack
the system actively: When a sufficiently bright pulse (still on the single-photon
level) of light of one polarisation (e.g. horizontal) is coupled into the detector just
before the time window of a signal pulse, the chance can be made arbitrarily high
that if a photon was detected (which can be found out by Eve during the sifting
process), it was of the orthogonal polarisation (here: vertical). Theoretically, if no
countermeasures are taken, this can lead to Eve’s full information about the key,
without her introducing any additional errors. Even worse: This attack is feasible
with todays technology without a lot of effort. It is probably the most effective
attack that can be launched against the TOE.
The impact of this attack is even increased since the effective dead time of the
detectors (at least of this specific implementation of the TOE) is not constant, but
depends on the counting rate. The reason for this is that if a photon hits the detector
shortly after a previous one has been registered, the APD will be still in the charging
process and the resulting electronic pulse will be rather low. If it is too low to be
detected by the discriminator, no pulse will be recorded by the system, but still
the charging process of the APD will start newly, whence the effective dead time is
prolonged. The higher the count rate, the higher the probability that such an event
occurs. In fact, using this effect, Eve can more or less selectively tune the efficiency
of the single photon detectors. Because of this effect, it is also not possible to simply
use the countermeasure proposed in [53], which is suppressing the other detector’s
pulses by software during the attributed dead time of one detector. This dead time
is not a fixed time span, but can be adjusted by Eve actively.
TI.B06b: Detector Dead Times II A different attack with similar results was
introduced in [54–56]. It uses a somewhat reciprocal idea of the previously explained,
always blinding the single photon detectors with bright enough light and only letting
one of them recover from time to time or even increasing the light intensity to
produce a signal pulse in the linear APD mode. A click during this active time
means that it has to have happened in the one detector that Eve did not blind
during that time.
TI.B07: Thermal Dependency of Breakdown Voltage Instead of using the dead
time to blind detectors, it is also possible to illuminate them very strongly (for a
short period of time) and thus heat them. Since the breakdown voltage of the APD
increases with increasing temperature, one can decrease the APD’s efficiency this
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way. This effect can be used to launch similar attacks like TI.B06a and TI.B06b
with hardware gated detectors [57]. As we don’t employ hardware gating in our
setup, this will have the same effect as the aforementioned ones.
TI.B08: Insufficient Gating Some QKD systems use hardware gating in the sense
that they increase the bias voltage of the APD over the breakdown threshold only
around the time a signal photon is expected. Still, if they are illuminated by bright
enough light, they output a pulse even during the time they should be switched off.
This can be used for an efficient intercept-resend attack [58,59]. Since no hardware
gating occurs in our setup, this attack cannot be conducted with our system.
TI.B09: Correlated Radiation The TOE could emit electromagnetic radiation
into the environment or onto supply or communication lines that might be used by
an eavesdropper to gain information about the polarization of the photons or about
the key itself.
TI.B10: Breakdown Flash The devices used for single photon detection in the
TOE (APDs) are known to emit a so-called breakdown flash whenever they detect
a photon [60]. An adversary could try to detect and analyze the polarization of
the breakdown flash and thus gain information about the measurement result of the
TOE. This is a special case of correlated radiation.
TI.B11: Coincidence Detection When two (different) detectors produce an event
within one time window (applied by software), we call this a coincidence detection.
The original BB84 protocol has not considered this possibility. Since it is impossible
for Alice and Bob to gain information from such events, one obvious solution is to
discard them. Unfortunately, this opens a quite big door for an eavesdropper [8,14].
Eve could use comparatively bright pulses of a certain polarization (e.g. horizontal,
in reality she would probably switch them more or less randomly) and send her pulse
into the system together with the pulse from the transmitter. In case her pulse has
the same polarization as Bob’s pulse, only one detector will produce an event. If
Eve uses sufficiently bright pulses, all other cases will result in coincidences between
at least two detectors and hence be discarded. Eve will gain (asymptotically) full
knowledge about the key without introducing errors.
TI.S01: Finite Key Length The keys produced by real QKD devices are necessa-
rily of finite length. The original protocols neglect this fact which can be exploited
by an eavesdropper.
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5.2.5 Attacks on Classical Channel
Ideally, there is no attack on the classical channel alone (for an attack on both
channels see next section) apart from a DOS attack. In reality, this may not be the
case.
5.2.5.1 Information Leakage
There could be two possible ways the system could leak information via the classical
channel:
TC.01: Correlated Radiation As in the quantum channel part there might be an
information leakage by correlated radiation being emitted from the physical parts
of the classical channel.
TC.02: Software Design Flaws The software of the TOE that communicates over
the classical channel could give out secret information over this channel.
5.2.5.2 Manipulation
TC.03: Insufficient Decoupling If the quantum channel is not sufficiently de-
coupled from the classical part, an adversary could try to manipulate the quantum
channel by tampering with the classical channel. She could, e.g. try to change the
voltage levels of the classical channel in order to possibly change some voltage levels
of the quantum part.
5.2.6 Hybrid Attacks
TH.01: Man-in-the-middle-attack As long as the classical channel is not authen-
ticated, the TOE may be subject to a Man-in-the-middle attack. In this scenario,
the eavesdropper is located between the two legitimate parties in the quantum chan-
nel as well as in the classical channel. She impersonates Bob towards Alice and Alice
towards Bob. In fact she can exchange a key with Alice and Bob and de- and en-
crypt their whole communication afterwards. The eavesdropper will have complete
knowledge about the key, hence authentication of the classical channel is highly
important.
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5.2.7 Summary
Threat Description
TQ.01 Direct Attacks on Ideal Quantum Channel
TI.A01 Spectral Overlap of Transmitted Photons
TI.A02 Spatial Overlap of Transmitted Photons
TI.A03 Temporal Overlap of Transmitted Photons
TI.A04 Mean Photon Number Mismatch or Instability
TI.A05 Induced Mean Photon Number Boost or Mismatch
TI.A06 Trojan Horse Attack Transmitter
TI.A07 Photon Number Splitting
TI.A08 Correlated Radiation
TI.A09 Random Number Generation
TI.B01 Temporal Detection Efficiency Overlap
TI.B02 Spatial Detection Efficiency Overlap
TI.B03 Spectral Detection Efficiency Overlap
TI.B04 Detector Efficiency Mismatch
TI.B05 Trojan Horse Attack Receiver
TI.B06a Detector Dead Times I
TI.B06b Detector Dead Times II
TI.B07 Thermal Dependency of Breakdown Voltage
TI.B08 Insufficient Gating
TI.B09 Correlated Radiation
TI.B10 Breakdown Flash
TI.B11 Coincidence Detection
TI.S01 Finite Key Length
TC.01 Correlated Radiation
TC.02 Software Design Flaws
TC.03 Insufficient Decoupling
TH.01 Man-in-the-middle Attack
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6.1 Protection Against Direct Attacks on Ideal
Quantum Channel: SFQ.01
In the ideal case an upper bound on Eve’s information about the key (after sifting
and error correction) can be calculated. By hashing the key to a smaller length,
Eve’s information on the final key can be reduced to fit the requirements of A.04.
This method is called privacy amplification (PA) [4, 5]. The resulting key length
ratio can be calculated using the following formula [8]:
R = max(1− 2H2(δ), 0) (6.1)
With quantum bit error rate (QBER) δ and the binary entropy function H2(δ) =
−δ log2 δ− (1− δ) log2(1− δ). Suitable hash functions can be found within the class
of universal2 hash functions [6].
6.2 Protection Against Side Channel Attacks on the
Quantum Channel
In general, there are two basic strategies against these attacks: The most obvious is
to try to eliminate the reason for the attack, improve the (non-ideal) implementation.
This way one can usually reduce the effect significantly. After that, in case the
eavesdropper is still able to gain information because of this effect, it would be
sufficient to find an upper bound of information the eavesdropper can get with
regard to the system specifications. If this is known, the key lengths can be further
reduced during the PA process.
We have measured some of the TOE’s properties and the results are mentioned where
appropriate, although this would not be part of a CC document. It’s important to
note that the measurements will never be perfect and the resulting uncertainty may
still allow the eavesdropper to gain more information than what was expected.
6.2.1 Spectral Overlap (TI.A01)
6.2.1.1 Spectral Selection of Laser Diodes: SFI.01
The laser diodes in the transmitter module are selected so that their spectral distri-
bution overlaps maximally. This has been investigated in detail in [61].
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6.2.1.2 Spectral Filtering: SFI.02*1
To reduce the information leakage to an eavesdropper further, spectral filtering can
be applied to restrict the spectral distinguishability.
6.2.1.3 Privacy Amplification Against Spectral Distinguishability: SFI.03*
The resulting information that is accessible to an eavesdropper due to spectral dis-
tinguishability can be reduced to a necessary level by privacy amplification. As an
estimation of the amount the mutual information between basis value b ∈ B and
measured wavelength λ ∈ Λ can be calculated as follows:
H(B : Λ) = H(B) +H(Λ)−H(B,Λ) (6.2)
with
H(Λ) = −
∫
pλ(λ) log2
[
pλ(λ)
]
dλ (6.3)
H(X) = −∑
b
p0(b) log2
[
p0(b)
]
(6.4)
H(B,Λ) = −∑
b
∫
p(b, λ) log p(b, λ) dλ (6.5)
with pλ(λ) =
∑
b p
0(b)Ib(λ) and Ib(λ) as the intensity of basis b at wavelength λ,
p0(b) the probability of choosing a particular b ∈ B and the conditional probability
p(b, λ) of finding a particular value of b ∈ B when a particular λ ∈ Λ was found.
6.2.1.4 Experimental Estimation
To estimate the amount of information given away from our setup, we used a home-
built single-photon spectrometer to measure the Intensity distribution Ib(λ) (see Fig.
6.1) and found that the resulting information gain for Eve was H(B : Λ) < 7·10−3 bit
per pulse [61].2
6.2.2 Spatial Overlap (TI.A02)
6.2.2.1 Spatial Filtering: SFI.04
If multiple laser diodes are used for the different polarizations, spatial distinguisha-
bility can hardly be reached by alignment procedures, especially since the spatial
profile of laser diodes depends strongly on the polarisation axis. Hence, spatial fil-
tering will be inevitable. This can be done by guiding the emitted light through a
series of pinholes or through a single mode optical fibre.
1An asterisk (*) means here, that this function has not been implemented in the current setup.
2Here it is assumed that the eavesdropper does not block any pulses. He could just let those
photons reach the transmitter that allow him to infer as much as possible about the polarisation.
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Figure 6.1: Experimental analysis of the spectra of the eight laser diodes used in the
TOE each in cw and pulsed mode [61].
6.2.2.2 Privacy Amplification Against Spatial Distinguishability: SFI.05*
The resulting information that is accessible to an eavesdropper due to spatial dis-
tinguishability can be reduced to a necessary level by privacy amplification. The
mutual information between basis value b ∈ B and measured spatial position x ∈ X
can be calculated analogously to equation (6.2):
H(B : X) = H(B) +H(X)−H(B,X) (6.6)
6.2.2.3 Experimental Estimation
Although the spatial profiles of multiple emitters should perfectly overlap behind a
single mode optical fibre in theory, this may not be true in reality. Especially when
the fibre is very short (in our case only 6 cm), this should be checked. Yet, we found
no significant difference in the spatial profiles of the eight laser diodes behind the
fibre above the noise level (Fig. 6.2). The calculated mutual information was on the
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Figure 6.2: Experimental analysis of the spatial emission profiles of the eight laser
diodes used in the TOE measured behind the 6 cm long single mode
optical fibre. The beam was collimated and then scanned with an APD
at a distance of 40 cm. The scanned area was 6.25 mm × 6.25 mm [61].
order of H(B : X) ∼ 10−5 bit per pulse [61].3
6.2.3 Temporal Overlap (TI.A03)
6.2.3.1 Temporal Alignment: SFI.06
The temporal profiles of the different laser diodes have to be overlapped maximally.
This can usually be done by delaying the electronic pulses by a suitable amount.
6.2.3.2 Privacy Amplification Against Temporal Distinguishability: SFI.07*
The resulting information that is accessible to an eavesdropper due to temporal
distinguishability can be reduced to a necessary level by privacy amplification. The
mutual information between basis value b ∈ B and measured time t ∈ T can be
calculated analogous to equation (6.2):
H(B : T ) = H(B) +H(T )−H(B, T ) (6.7)
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Figure 6.3: Experimental analysis of the emission times of the eight laser diodes
used in the TOE before (left) and after (right) maximizing the temporal
overlap [61].
6.2.3.3 Experimental Estimation
We measured the distributions of time differences between clock pulse and output
pulse of a single APD for the eight laser diodes in the TOE with a fast oscilloscope.
The results are shown in Fig. 6.3. After optimization of the overlap (right) by
setting the digital delay lines for each laser diode, the resulting mutual information
would have been H(B : T ) ≤ 3.0 · 10−3 bit per pulse [61].4
6.2.4 Mean Photon Number Mismatch (TI.A04)
6.2.4.1 Mean Photon Number Monitoring: SFI.08*5
In order to ensure that the different laser diodes are emitting the same mean num-
ber of photons per pulse, the output of the transmitter module is monitored by
a calibrated internal APD within the transmitter. The pulse intensities should be
3Here it is assumed that the eavesdropper does not block any pulses. He could just let those
photons reach the transmitter that allow him to infer as much as possible about the polarisation.
4Here it is assumed that the eavesdropper does not block any pulses. He could just let those
photons reach the transmitter that allow him to infer as much as possible about the polarisation.
5At the moment, the TOE uses a periodic calibration (e.g. every 15 min) to avoid long-term
drifts of the mean photon numbers and static mean photon number mismatches. This is not
sufficient, though.
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controlled in order to optimize the indistinguishability. Since it will have to be a
statistical analysis, short-term fluctuations will have to be kept in mind (at least
during PA).
6.2.4.2 Privacy Amplification According to Photon Number Mismatch:
SFI.09*
The resulting information that is accessible to an eavesdropper due to a mean photon
number mismatch can be reduced to a necessary level by PA.
6.2.5 Induced Mean Photon Number Boost or Mismatch
(TI.A05)
6.2.5.1 Mean Photon Number Monitoring: SFI.08
See section 6.2.4.1.
6.2.5.2 Privacy Amplification According to Photon Number Mismatch:
SFI.09*
See section 6.2.4.2.
6.2.5.3 Monitor Photo Diode: SFI.10*
In order to make sure that bright light cannot enter into the transmitter module
unnoticed, one could employ a monitor photo diode to check for this.
6.2.6 Trojan Horse Attack (Transmitter, TI.A06)
6.2.6.1 Monitor Photo Diode: SFI.10*
See section 6.2.5.3.
6.2.7 Photon Number Splitting (TI.A07)
6.2.7.1 Mean Photon Number Optimization: SFI.11a*
In order to reduce the information that is accessible to an eavesdropper, the mean
photon number µ can be optimized. Generally speaking, the optimal mean photon
number µopt is on the order of the link transmission: µopt ∼ η. The problem with this
approach is that the resulting key rate is then (at least over some range) proportional
to η2.
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The resulting information that is accessible to an eavesdropper due to a photon
number splitting attack can be reduced to a necessary level (shrinking ratio R) by
privacy amplification:
R = max
(
(1−∆wcp)−H2(δ)− (1−∆wcp)H2
(
δ
1−∆wcp
)
, 0
)
(6.8)
(see [8]) with
∆wcp = pM/pD =
1
2η
(µ+O(µ2)). (6.9)
pM is the probability that a multiphoton pulse is emitted, pD is the probability that
an emitted photon is detected. ∆wcp is the fraction of so-called tagged photons,
i.e. photons that Eve can get full information about during a PNS attack without
introducing errors.
6.2.7.2 Decoy State Extension: SFI.11b
In the formula above, without better knowledge, a worst case value for ∆wcp has to
be assumed. The so-called decoy state extension to the BB84 protocol [40, 62–64]
has introduced a method of reducing the information of a potential eavesdropper,
performing a PNS attack. It calculates an upper bound for ∆decoy ≤ ∆wcp, with the
result that the optimal µdecoy is approximately independent of the link transmission
and hence QKD can be securely used up to a lot longer distances than before [65,66].
∆decoy can be calculated when at least two different mean photon number µ, µ
′ are
used by the transmitter randomly. Put simple, transmitter and receiver calculate
the transmission values separately for each mean photon number and from that they
can calculate ∆decoy.
In this case Eqn. (6.8) has to be adpated to use ∆decoy instead of ∆wcp:
R = max
(
(1−∆decoy)−H2(δ)− (1−∆decoy)H2
(
δ
1−∆decoy
)
, 0
)
(6.10)
∆decoy is calculated according to
∆decoy =
µ
µ′ − µ
(
µe−µQ′
µ′e−µ′Q
− 1
)
+
µe−µQ0
µ′Q
(6.11)
where Q,Q′, Q0 are measured detection probabilities of pulses with mean photon
number µ, µ′, 0, i.e. Q0 is the background event detection probability.
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6.2.8 Correlated Radiation (Transmitter, TI.A08)
6.2.8.1 Shielding SFI.12*
Like in classical cryptography systems, the transmitter module has to be shielded
and decoupled from the environment so that it doesn’t emit any electromagnetic
radiation.
6.2.9 Random Number Generator (TI.A09)
6.2.9.1 Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG): SFI.13*6
In order to close the loop-hole of in principle predictable pseudo-random numbers
and hence predictable basis and bit value choices made by Alice, a true random
number generator should be used, for example [67]. An obvious choice could be
to employ a random number generator based on a quantum process (QRNG)7. If
there is an imbalance between the number of 0s and 1s (a so-called bias), this can
be treated analogously to the mismatch of mean photon numbers. Usually this bias
can be made very small, though.
6.2.10 Temporal Detection Efficiency Mismatch (TI.B01)
6.2.10.1 Equalization of Path Lengths: SFI.14
The best possible (but probably never sufficient) way of treating this is to maximize
the temporal overlap of all detector signals. That starts with the optical path lengths
and stops at the digitization of the event times. If this is not done (and instead e.g.
only the following step), there may be the risk that e.g. different optical path lengths
could be used in connection with the breakdown flash to gain more information.
6.2.10.2 Hardware/ Software Delay: SFI.15
In the TOE, there is no hardware time window that determines whether a detection
event is treated as background or signal. This is done in software here. So one
can either add an electronic delay in the signal pulse paths or add some delays in
software before the time window is applied (as it is done at present).
6At the moment, the TOE uses stored random numbers from a QRNG.
7A rather high flux of random numbers is necessary. For each pulse, an average value of 5
random bits is used, since not only basis and bit value have to be chosen, but also to which of
the three pulse classes (decoy, signal, background) it belongs and they do not occur with the
same probability.
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6.2.10.3 Privacy Amplification: SFI.16*
Remaining differences in the temporal detection efficiency have to be taken into
account during PA. This has been examined in [17, 48, 49] for systems with two
detectors. To this end the corresponding properties of the TOE have to be known
well.
6.2.11 Spatial Detection Efficiency Mismatch (TI.B02)
6.2.11.1 Maximization of Spatial Overlap: SFI.17
In order to maximize the spatial overlap of the APDs, it should be attempted to
equalize the spatial efficiency distribution of the four detectors8. In the TOE this
can be done by rotating and tilting the beam splitter (BS) and polarizing beam
splitters (PBSs) in the receiver module. There will always be a remaining difference,
of course.
6.2.11.2 Reduction of the Field of View: SFI.18
In order to further reduce the impact of this effect, it can be ensured that the field
of view of the receiver is not defined by the active area of the APDs. In other words
it should be impossible to shine light onto the outskirts of their active areas, where
the detection efficiency mismatch is presumably worst.
6.2.11.3 Privacy Amplification: SFI.19*
Remaining inhomogeneities have to be taken care of during PA as in SFI.16. This
has been discussed for two-detector setups in [17], too.
6.2.12 Spectral Detection Efficiency Mismatch (TI.B03)
The spectral detection efficiency mismatch is presumably rather small, since the
spectral efficiency differences of the detectors are comparably small. But the passive
optical components inside the Bob module also have to be taken into account.
6.2.12.1 Selection of APDs with Regard to Spectral Efficiency: SFI.20*
To start from the best possible situation, one should try to select APDs with a
maximum overlap of their efficiency in the important spectral area (see SFI.21).
8This procedure will usually be performed anyway to maximize the total efficiency of the system
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6.2.12.2 Spectral Filtering: SFI.21
Since the relative spectral efficiency mismatch is usually maximal far away from the
design wavelength of the TOE, a narrow band pass filter9 can be introduced at the
entrance of the detector module. In the TOE there is an interference filter used with
a width of 3 nm FWHM.
6.2.12.3 Privacy Amplification: SFI.22*
Like in the previous cases, the remaining differences have to be addressed in the PA
process. This can be handled like in SFI.19 and SFI.16. For two-detector setup this
is shown in [17].
6.2.13 Constant Detector Efficiency Mismatch (TI.B04)
6.2.13.1 Adjustment of the Detector Efficiencies: SFI.23*
After applying SFI.17, SFI.18, SFI.20 and SFI.21, there may still be some constant
detector efficiency mismatch. This could be optimized by adjusting the bias voltage
of the APDs themselves, since that affects the detection efficiency of each APD
separately. This method should be used very carefully, though, since other properties
of the APD (like dead time, timing jitter and signal pulse height) may be affected
by this change, too.
6.2.13.2 Privacy Amplification: SFI.24*
The resulting information that is accessible to an eavesdropper due to a detector
efficiency mismatch can be reduced to a necessary level by privacy amplification [8,
Theorem 7]. If the total efficiency is described by η = (1 − ηind)(1 − ηdep), where
ηind and ηdep are basis independent and dependent efficiencies, the shrinking ratio is
R = max
(
1−H2(δ)−H2
(
δ +
ηdep
1− ηdep
)
, 0
)
(6.12)
where δ is the standard QBER.
6.2.14 Trojan Horse Attack (Receiver, TI.B05)
So far it seems that a Trojan horse attack is not feasible, since there are no actively
switched components in the detector module. Spectral filtering (SFI.21) and bright
light detection (SFI.25) would be effective countermeasures against such an attack.
9Such a filter is already used in the TOE for background suppression.
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6.2.15 Detector Dead Times (TI.B06)
6.2.15.1 Bright Light Detection: SFI.25*
Attacks on detector dead times using bright light pulses (TI.B06b) can be detected
by introducing a standard photo detector that monitors the amount of light at the
entrance of the Bob module (behind all filters) [68]10 or measuring the APD current
[54]. When a reasonable level is exceeded (even for short times) the respective events
could be discarded. This would not prevent TI.B06a, though, but may be interesting
against other attacks, too.
6.2.15.2 APD Bias Monitoring: SFI.26*
One way to rule out an attack aimed at the dead time of (ungated passively quen-
ched) APDs is to sense whether all (at least all (!) APDs are active and allow clicks
to be recorded or processed only when this is the case. One possibility for such
an implementation would be to measure whether the voltages at the anodes of all
APDs are sufficiently high (so that a detection event would definitely trigger the
discriminator). For more details see the following chapter. This will also counteract
the effect that for high clock rates (periods smaller than the dead time), the resulting
keys can show anti-correlations [53]. In order to make sure that this countermeasure
does not limit the sifted key rate unnecessarily, the transmitted photon intensity
can be optimized [53].
6.2.15.3 Privacy Amplification: SFI.27*
It will have to be investigated whether or not SFI.26 can successfully negate all
possible dead time attacks. It may turn out that there will still remain some need
for additional PA. On the other hand it is clear that software methods alone (e.g.
PA or checking whether some detector has fired shortly before the current event [53])
will not suffice.
6.2.16 Thermal Dependency of Breakdown Voltage (TI.B07)
6.2.16.1 Bright Light Detection: SFI.25*
Since this attack requires very bright, but potentially short pulses, this can be
detected by a photo diode (see 6.2.15.1). Signal events should be discarded when a
bright light pulse is detected before or at the same time.
10This idea was not so explicitly mentioned in the finally submitted version [54].
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6.2.17 Insufficient Gating (TI.B08)
This attack is currently not applicable to the TOE. Still, SFI.26* (section 6.2.15.2)
would prevent this attack efficiently, too.
6.2.18 Correlated Radiation (TI.B09)
6.2.18.1 Shielding SFI.28*
Like in classical cryptography systems, the detector module has to be shielded and
decoupled from the environment so that it does not emit any (security relevant)
electromagnetic radiation.
6.2.19 Breakdown Flash (TI.B10)
6.2.19.1 Spectral Filtering Inside the Detector Module: SFI.21
Since the spectrum of the breakdown flash is relatively broad [60], its effect can be
reduced significantly by using a narrow filter. In order to suppress the information
leakage due to this effect, one can utilize a narrow spectral filter close to the detector
module, so that Eve cannot access the space between the APDs and the filter.
6.2.19.2 Spatial Filtering at the Detector: SFI.29*
To further reduce the effect of breakdown flashes, the optical path from the APDs
to the environment (outside the secured area) can be blocked as well as possible.
(This may already be sufficiently done by SFI.18 (see 6.2.11.2).)
6.2.19.3 Privacy Amplification: SFI.30*
The breakdown flash can be treated analogously to the multi photon pulses and its
countermeasure by privacy amplification. When the rate of photons emitted this
way is known, a ∆bdf can be calculated that has to be added to ∆wcp or ∆decoy.
R = max
(
(1−∆′)−H2(δ)− (1−∆′)H2
(
δ
1−∆′
)
, 0
)
(6.13)
with ∆′ = ∆wcp + ∆bdf or ∆′ = ∆decoy + ∆bdf , depending on the treatment of multi
photon events.
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6.2.20 Coincidence Detection (TI.B11)
6.2.20.1 Random Bit Attribution: SFI.31*
When a coincidence (two events inside one signal time window) is detected, a random
single detection event has to be assigned to the event in order to prevent an attack
described in the QKD security proofs [8,14]. It goes without saying that the source
of randomness should be quantum.
6.2.21 Finite Key Length (TI.S01)
6.2.21.1 Privacy Amplification: SFI.32*
The statistical fluctuations that happen because of finite key lengths can be treated
during privacy amplification. This is a topic of current research [69–71].
6.2.22 Correlated Radiation over the Classical Channel (TC.01)
6.2.22.1 Separation of Circuits: SFC.01*
Careful separation of internal and external circuits should suppress the transmission
of signals that may not leave the secured area. Since the classical channel ideally
does not convey any sensitive information itself, it has only to be ruled out that
sensitive information that should not be on the classical channel at all, gets out via
this. One possibility of doing this could be to use completely separated circuits (e.g.
with optocouplers) to transfer information from one circuit to the other. In such a
way, power supply lines and even ground potentials should be decoupled. This will
also address TC.03, where this is used to manipulate rather than read information.
6.2.23 Software Design Flaws (TC.02)
6.2.23.1 Code Review: SFC.02*
In order to rule out that sensitive information is accidently transmitted via the
classical channel, the software has to be reviewed for security loopholes.
6.2.24 Insufficient Decoupling (TC.03)
6.2.24.1 Separation of Circuits: SFC.01*
See 6.2.22.1.
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6.2.25 Man-in-the-Middle-Attack
6.2.25.1 Authentication: SFH.01
A man-in-the-middle-attack can only be opposed by authentication of the legitimate
parties. Suitable ways to do this securely are Wegman-Carter message authentica-
tion [7] or some standard HMAC routines.
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6.2.26 Summary
Threat SFR Description
TQ.01 SFQ.01 Privacy amplification for ideal quantum channel
TI.A01 SFI.01 Spectral Selection of Laser Diodes
SFI.02* Spectral Filtering
SFI.03* Privacy Amplification
TI.A02 SFI.04 Spatial Filtering
SFI.05* Privacy Amplification
TI.A03 SFI.06 Maximizing temporal overlap
SFI.07* Privacy Amplification
TI.A04 SFI.08* Mean Photon Number Monitoring
SFI.09* Privacy Amplification
TI.A05 SFI.08* Mean Photon Number Monitoring
SFI.09* Privacy Amplification
TI.A06 SFI.10* Optical Isolator
TI.A07 SFI.11a* Mean Photon Number Optimization
SFI.11b Decoy State Extension
TI.A08 SFI.12* Electromagnetic Shielding
TI.A09 SFI.13* Quantum Random Number Generator
TI.B01 SFI.14 Equalization of Path Lengths
SFI.15 Hardware/ Software Delay
SFI.16* Privacy Amplification
TI.B02 SFI.17 Maximization of Spatial Overlap
SFI.18 Reduction of Field of View
SFI.19* Privacy Amplification
TI.B03 SFI.20* APD Selection for Efficiency
SFI.21 Spectral Filtering
SFI.22* Privacy Amplification
TI.B04 SFI.23* Adjustment of the Detector Efficiencies
SFI.24* Privacy Amplification
TI.B05 N/A (Trojan Horse Attack Ineffective)
TI.B06a SFI.25* Bright Light Detection
SFI.26* APD Bias Monitoring
SFI.27* Privacy Amplification
TI.B06b SFI.26* APD Bias Monitoring
SFI.27* Privacy Amplification
TI.B07 SFI.25* Bright Light Detection
TI.B08 N/A (No Hardware Gating Implemented)
TI.B09 SFI.28* Electromagnetic Shielding
TI.B10 SFI.21 Spectral Filtering
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Threat SFR Description
SFI.29* Spatial Filtering (/SFI.18)
SFI.30* Privacy Amplification
TI.B11 SFI.31* Random Bit Attribution
TI.S01 SFI.32* Privacy Amplification
TC.01 SFC.01* Separation of Circuits
TC.02 SFC.02* Code Review
TC.03 SFC.01* Separation of Circuits
TH.01 SFH.01 Authentication
67

7 Eavesdropping without
Interception: A New Dead Time
Attack
Contents
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.2 Prerequisites for the applicability of this attack . . . . . 69
7.3 The model QKD system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.4 The attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.4.1 Blinding pulse detection probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.4.2 Signal pulse detection probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.5 Experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.7 Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5 I have listed a number of attacks that can possibly be launched on
real implementations of QKD systems similar to the one we have developed. In this
section I want to examine one of these attacks (TI.B06a, see 5.2.4.2) more carefully.
It exploits the so-called dead time of single photon counting detectors, i.e. the
time a detector needs to recover from a detection event. We have experimentally
demonstrated such an attack and propose an effective countermeasure [72].
7.2 Prerequisites for the applicability of this attack
Two characteristic features of many demonstrated QKD systems enable this parti-
cular attack: The first is the fact that when an SPD registers a photon, there usually
follows a period of time during which it will not be able to output a second detec-
tion event. This period (called dead time) can range from less than a nanosecond to
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some tens of microseconds, depending on the specific SPD. In our system, we use
passively quenched Silicon avalanche photodiodes (SiAPDs)1, with a particularly
long dead time of about 0.5 µs (see Fig. 7.1). The second feature is the periodic
operation. This means, there are well defined times when the transmitter emits a
signal. Consequently the receiver accepts detection events only during narrow time
windows – all events outside these time slots are discarded. For this attack it is ideal
if this gating is done on the output signal of the SPD (e.g. in software) rather than
by controlling the sensitivity of the detector2. The presence of these two properties,
the dead time of the SPD and a (software) time window that determines whether
a detection event is considered background or signal are necessary requirements for
this particular attack, that we describe below.
7.3 The model QKD system
For reasons of simplicity and because it fits to our setup, the QKD device shall in
principle employ a BB84 protocol with the polarization of single photons as qubits.
The detector part shall be designed as shown in Fig. 7.2: The first non-polarizing
50/50 BS serves as a random basis switch, if the incident photon is reflected, a
PBS together with two SiAPDs will analyse the photon’s polarization in the H/V
basis. However, if the photon is transmitted, the half-wave plate will rotate its
polarization by 45◦ and the remaining PBS together with the two SiAPDs will
analyse the photon’s polarization in the ±45◦ basis. I also assume that no hardware
gating is used, i.e. the SPDs are in principle always active. A time window to
discriminate signal from background counts is applied on the output logic signal
(either in hardware or software). Suppose that the transmitter (Alice) sends the
i-th qubit at time ti = i · T with the period T and the receiver (Bob) expects the
i-th qubit between ti −∆tw/2 and ti + ∆tw/2, so that the time window has a width
of ∆tw. In this experiment the period was T = 4 µs and ∆tw = 5 ns (see fig. 7.1).
7.4 The attack
At least one attack has already been proposed by V. Makarov and co-workers [54],
that makes use of the dead time of SPDs. Similar attacks have been proposed
in [55–58], all using some kind of intercept-resend strategy. The one described here
is different in this way. To perform this attack, the eavesdropper (Eve) simply sends
in light pulses of one of the four polarizations used in the protocol (H, V, +45◦ or
1We are using the commercially available PerkinElmer C30902S.
2When sensitivity gating is applied, the timing of the attack is getting crucial. If it is possible to
trigger an avalanche around the start of the gate interval without triggering a signal pulse at
the output of the SPD, this attack will still be feasible. Since our system does not use hardware
gating, we do not investigate this any further.
70
7.4 The attack
//
t (µs)
R
el
at
iv
e
de
te
ct
io
n
effi
ci
en
cy
0 4 4.20.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
D−, DH , DV
//
∆tw
tB,i ti tB,i+1 ti+1
Figure 7.1: Probability for a detection event (normalized to the value after 3.5 µs
after a detection at t = 0). SiAPDs exhibit a detection efficiency which
depends on the overbias voltage applied. After a detection, depending
on the electronics, it takes some time until the detector regains full
efficiency. Due to additional threshold circuits, there is also a time where
the detector does not output a click at all. For the characterization of
the detector’s dead time, we illuminated it by two consecutive faint laser
pulses. The delay between the first and second pulse has been tuned
and the corresponding relative detection efficiency was recorded. The
line is a fit using the function E(t) = A
2
(
1 + erf
(
t−τD
τ2
))
·
(
1− e− tτ3
)
with fit parameters A, τD, τ2, τ3. For the attack, the eavesdropper sends
sufficiently bright pulses onto Bob’s detectors just before the regular
pulses from Alice arrive, in this case we used a time difference ti− tB,i =
200 ns. Pulse and gate widths are not to scale, both are typically on the
order of 1 ns.
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Figure 7.2: Schematic drawing of the setup: The transmitter (Alice) on the left,
her pulses marked blue, the eavesdropper (Eve) in the center, her pulses
marked red and the receiver (Bob) on the right. When Eve sends a
sufficiently intense light pulse polarized in on of the four polarization,
up to three of Bob’s detectors are inactive with a high probability. Alice’s
following signal pulse can only be detected in the remaining detector.
−45◦), outside of Bob’s time window. With a certain probability, depending on the
intensity of the pulse, three of Bob’s SPDs will be inactive afterwards, because they
have detected photons and are now recovering. If Eve’s timing is good, she can
thus manipulate the average detection probability of Bob’s SPDs during signal time
windows, three of the four values will be decreased, while one (the one belonging
to the perpendicular polarization she has used) remains constant. In fact, when
passively quenched SiAPDs are used at output rates (at Alice) of some tens of MHz,
the SPDs will be inactive for several clock periods. This means that the relative
efficiency of one of the SPDs is increased, so that the probability that this detector
registers an event is elevated. By increasing the intensity, Eve can make sure that
the detection probabilities of three detectors become negligible, so that whenever
Bob registers an event during this time, Eve will know that it can only be the one
perpendicular to the polarization she had sent in before. She should make sure, of
course, not to send in a blinding pulse of a different polarization, before all Bob’s
detectors are expected to be active again (this effect can also happen when Alice
runs at a high repetition rate compared to the dead time [73,74]).
As long as the polarization of Eve’s blinding pulses are perfectly aligned with Bob’s
polarization measurements, the attack will not introduce any errors between Alice
and Bob. The amount of information that Eve will have about the sifted key can
be tuned by her, ideally she will get as close to full information as she wants.
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If we assume that the delay between two of Bob’s signal time slots and hence also
Eve’s blinding pulses is greater than the average dead time of the SPDs, which itself
is longer than a signal time slot, the probability of triggering one of the detectors
with a blinding pulse can be calculated. Doing so we can further assume the recovery
process to be discrete with a certain dead time, which simplifies the calculations.
7.4.1 Blinding pulse detection probabilities
To evaluate the effect of this attack, one has to calculate the detection probabilities
of blinding pulses (those issued from Eve) and signal pulses (emitted by Alice). We
start with the blinding pulses. Let Pp(µ
eff
B ) and Pd(µ
eff
B ) be the probability that a
blinding pulse is recognized in the detector parallel and diagonal to the blinding
pulse, respectively. The corresponding probability in the orthogonal detector is
negligible. They depend on the blinding pulse intensity expressed as their mean
photon number per pulse µeffB := ηBµB. We define this as the number Eve would
have to send in to an ideal detector module (regarding transmission and detector
efficiency) built like depicted in Fig. 7.2. Uniform, but non-unity transmission and
detector efficiencies can be included therein. If the receiver module used active basis
switching (i.e. only two detectors), only half of the blinding pulse intensity would
be sufficient.
The probabilities of registering detections in one, two or three of the respective
detectors at the same time are:
pp(µ
eff
B ) = Pp(µ
eff
B )︸ ︷︷ ︸
parallel detector clicks
· (1− Pd(µeffB ))(1− Pd(µeffB ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
both diagonal detectors do not click
(7.1)
pd(µ
eff
B ) = Pd(µ
eff
B ) · (1− Pp(µeffB ))(1− Pd(µeffB )) (2×) (7.2)
ppd(µ
eff
B ) = Pp(µ
eff
B ) · Pd(µeffB ) · (1− Pd(µeffB )) (2×) (7.3)
pdd(µ
eff
B ) = P
2
d (µ
eff
B ) · (1− Pp(µeffB )) (7.4)
ppdd(µ
eff
B ) = Pp(µ
eff
B ) · P 2d (µeffB ) (7.5)
So the probabilities that none, one, two or three detectors fire from a blinding pulse
are (theoretically, four detectors do not fire at once, if the polarizations are correctly
aligned):
p(0)(µ
eff
B ) = (1− Pp(µeffB )) · (1− Pd(µeffB ))2 (7.6)
p(1)(µ
eff
B ) = pp(µ
eff
B ) + 2pd(µ
eff
B ) (7.7)
p(2)(µ
eff
B ) = 2ppd(µ
eff
B ) + pdd(µ
eff
B ) (7.8)
p(3)(µ
eff
B ) = ppdd(µ
eff
B ) (7.9)
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7.4.2 Signal pulse detection probabilities
Using the previous results, the probability that a detector clicks from a signal pulse,
depending on the detector’s polarization φ and the signal pulse’s polarization θ with
respect to the blinding pulse can be calculated.
pSθ,φ(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = (1− Pφ(µeffB ))P Sθ (µeffS ) (7.10)
with φ, θ ∈ {p, d, o} meaning parallel, diagonal and orthogonal and P xo (µeffx ) ≡ 0 and
the mean photon number per signal pulse at the receiver µeffS := ηµS.
From this, the amount of information, an adversary can gain from such an attack,
can be estimated: The difference between the maximum (= 1) and the current value
of the binary entropy is used as the information gain a potential eavesdropper would
have:
IEB = 1−H2(p(xEve = xBob)) (7.11)
= 1 + Pr(xEve = xBob) log(Pr(xEve = xBob))
+ Pr(xEve 6= xBob) log(Pr(xEve 6= xBob)) (7.12)
With
p‖(µeffB , µ
eff
S ) := p
S
p,p(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) + p
S
d,d(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) and (7.13)
p⊥(µeffB , µ
eff
S ) := p
S
o,o(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) + p
S
d,d(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) (7.14)
we find:
p0BH (µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = p‖(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S )
p1BH (µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = p⊥(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S )
}
if Eve sends H (7.15)
p0BV (µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = p⊥(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S )
p1BV (µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = p‖(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S )
}
if Eve sends V (7.16)
p0BP (µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = p‖(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S )
p1BP (µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = p⊥(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S )
}
if Eve sends +45◦=P (7.17)
p0BM (µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = p⊥(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S )
p1BM (µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = p‖(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S )
}
if Eve sends -45◦=M (7.18)
It is intuitively clear that for large µeffB , i.e. high blinding intensities, all terms with
pSd,d and p
S
p,p will become small, because most of the time, all detectors but the one
orthogonal to the blinding pulse will be inactive (see Fig. 7.4).
Now the information gain (7.12) can be calculated as:
IEB(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = 1 +
p‖
p‖ + p⊥
log2
(
p‖
p‖ + p⊥
)
+
p⊥
p‖ + p⊥
log2
(
p⊥
p‖ + p⊥
)
(7.19)
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In the simulation (Fig. 7.3) it is assumed that the photon statistics of signal and
blinding pulses are Poissonian and thus Pp(µ
eff
B ) = 1 − e−
µeff
B
2 , Pd(µ
eff
B ) = 1 − e−
µeff
B
4 ,
P Sp (µ
eff
S ) = 1− e−
µeff
S
2 and P Sd (µ
eff
S ) = 1− e−
µeff
S
4 .
7.5 Experimental setup
In order to demonstrate the previously described attack we set up a version of our
free space QKD system (see Chapter 4) in the lab. The transmitter (Alice) contains
four laser diodes with their beams combined on a set of two conical mirrors, oriented
such that their polarizations are at the four necessary polarizations. After a short
free space link we placed one of our Bob receiver modules configured as depicted
in Fig. 7.2. The Alice module was connected to a standard PC via a USB 2.0
connection, while the Bob module was connected to a home build time tagging unit,
connected to another standard PC.
Additionally to this usual setup, we set up a second faint pulse transmitter module
(Eve), similar to the Alice module, only with special emphasis laid on the fact that
it should emit pulses with comparatively high mean photon numbers. For easier
synchronization with Alice and Bob, the four laser diodes inside the Eve module
were driven by the four extra laser diode drivers of Alice, usually used for the decoy
state protocol extension. The light emitted by Eve was coupled into the free space
link using a non-polarizing beam splitter (see Fig. 7.2). The timing was set such
that Alice’s signal pulses occurred every 4 µs (to allow the SiAPDs to recover with
a high probability between two consecutive blinding pulses), preceded by a blinding
pulse from Eve, 200 ns before. The value of the delay between blinding and signal
pulses was chosen, so that it be longer than the processing time of the timetagging
electronics (140 ns), but still within the dead time of the SiAPDs (∼ 500 ns, see Fig.
7.1). The mean photon number µeffB of the blinding pulses was controlled by inserting
different combinations of neutral density filters. Eve’s key was deduced from the
classical communication between Alice and Bob. According to the BB84 protocol,
Bob communicates to Alice when and in which basis he detected a photon, with Alice
returning her basis choice. This information together with the knowledge about the
setting of her blinding pulses enables Eve to construct a key which coincides with
Alice’s and Bob’s key in case of equal bases between Alice, Bob and Eve.
7.6 Results
We ran the protocol with different blinding pulse intensities, the results are shown in
Tab. 7.1 and Fig. 7.3 (and for illustration Fig. 7.4). As expected, for low blinding
pulse intensities, Eve’s sifted key was hardly correlated with the ones of Alice and
Bob, but the more powerful her pulses got, the better the match between the keys.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 7.3: Experimental results of the eavesdropping attack (a) showing the proba-
bility for detecting blinding pulse photons in zero, one, two, three or four
detectors depending on the effective mean photon number per blinding
pulse. (b) shows the QBER of Alice’s and Bob’s key and the informa-
tion about this key gathered by Eve. By using different combinations of
neutral density filters, the blinding pulse intensity was adjusted, while
keeping the signal pulse intensity constant. With increasing number of
photons per blinding pulse the probability that three detectors are blin-
ded increases rapidly resulting in an information of > 0.9 bit for about
17 photons, while the QBER does not increase and leaves Alice ignorant
about the attack.
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Figure 7.4: Experimental results with only horizontal blinding pulses. This illus-
trates how the signal pulse detection probabilities (magnified in the inset)
of the horizontal and both diagonal SPD are modified with increasing
blinding pulse intensity. When the blinding pulse intensity is high, most
of the time three detectors are inactive, so that the signal pulse can only
trigger the SPD orthogonal to the blinding pulse (lower image).
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µeffB QBER Alice-Bob / % QBER Bob-Eve / % Eve’s Information IEB
0.37 1.10 48.17 0.001
0.49 1.12 47.54 0.002
0.83* 1.09 45.24 0.007
1.88 1.01 38.43 0.039
5.29* 1.11 21.00 0.259
9.75 1.12 6.91 0.638
16.52* 1.25 1.17 0.908
Table 7.1: Experimental results of the eavesdropping attack exploiting the dead
time of the passively quenched SiAPDs. The datasets marked with a ”*”
are the ones corresponding to the last three images of Fig. 7.5.
The maximum overlap between Bob’s and Eve’s sifted keys was 98.83% at a mean
photon number per blinding pulse of µeffB = 16.52, corresponding to an information
I = 0.908 Bit. The QBER between Alice and Bob stayed at a constant level of
about 1.1%3 as shown in Tab. 7.1.
The calculated blinding pulse probabilities are in good agreement with the experi-
mental data when the blinding pulse intensities µeffB are rather low. For higher values
of µeffB , the prediction is considerably higher than what our count rates showed to
be. We expect that this is because we have used neutral density filters to set the
different intensities and with increasing mean photon number per pulse, the number
of background events rises, too. Background events blind the detectors, which in
turn leads to a decreased blinding pulse detection probability.
As an illustration we used Bob’s sifted key4 to encrypt the logo of our university
using a one-time-pad and decrypted this with Eve’s sifted key (see Fig. 7.5).
7.7 Countermeasures
Some countermeasures against the effects of the dead time of passively quenched
APDs have already been proposed [54,73,75]. We suggest a conceptually very easy
and very efficient different method: By monitoring the voltage level at the high
voltage pin of the SiAPD, one can make sure that it is charged above the level it
3This is true when coincident detection events during the signal time window were discarded.
As mentioned in section 5.2.4.2, this generally opens a security loop hole. If the according
countermeasure (see 6.2.20) was applied, the QBER between Alice and Bob actually decreases
with increasing mean photon number per blinding pulse, since the probability that more than
one detector was even active decreased and hence the probability for a coincidence detection
as well.
4Eve’s key is primarily correlated with Bob’s sifted key, because she can predict what he will
measure. The QBER between Alice and Bob affects the overlap between Alice’s key and Eve’s
key.
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Alice Bob
Eve
I
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= 0.259 I
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= 0.908
Figure 7.5: Application of the results obtained in the experiment. Alice uses her
(error corrected) key to encrypt the original image (top left corner) and
sends the ciphertext (top center) to Bob, who uses his (error corrected)
key to decrypt the image (top right corner). The three images below
are decrypted using Eve’s deduction of the sifted key, emitting blinding
pulses with a mean photon number of µeffB = 0.83, µ
eff
B = 5.29 and µ
eff
B =
16.52, respectively.
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Figure 7.6: Bias voltage at the SiAPD. After a detection event, the voltage drops
measurably. This can be used to decide whether or not all SPDs are
active. The voltage has been recorded with a fast oscilloscope at the
cathode of the SiAPD.
needs so that a detection will generate an electronic pulse above the discriminator
threshold (see Fig. 7.6 and Fig. 7.7). Now only those detection events shall be used
for the key generation where all four detectors were active in this sense, rendering
such an attack useless. It also overcomes the problem of correlations in the sifted key
because of detectors being inactive from a previous signal event as mentioned in [73].
This has been further investigated in [74], which proposes some methods and proves
their validity, but there, a fixed dead time was assumed. Still, they also mention an
idea similar to ours. Furthermore it is technically easier than holding all detectors
inactive while one of them is within the dead time as proposed in [75]. A more
complex technique, partly involving our idea, has recently been published in [76]. It
uses hardware gating, randomly switched hardware and software bit mapping (while
the hardware mapping is switched for all detectors simultaneously during the time
when all detectors are fully sensitive) and the measurement of voltage at and current
through the SiAPD.
It is obvious that the signal rate (and hence the sifted key rate, too) drop when
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Figure 7.7: Bias voltage at the SiAPD together with the output NIM pulses mea-
sured at a high incident photon rate. This also illustrates that no NIM
pulse is triggered when the SiAPD is not sufficiently charged.
such an attack is launched. When Eve uses high blinding pulse intensities, only
one detector should be active, so the total rate will be decreased to 25 % of the
undisturbed case (see insets in Fig. 7.4). One could have the idea to monitor the
signal rate in order to detect such an attack, but this is not recommended. First
of all, one would need to know the attenuation of the optical channel without Eve
present. But Eve could be in there right from the start, so this is almost impossible
to determine. Furthermore Eve could replace the quantum channel with one that has
less attenuation (using quantum teleportation). This is theoretically no problem,
although technically difficult. One more reason is that in free space QKD signal
rate fluctuations are rather normal, since the attenuation changes with weather
conditions etc.
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8 Conclusion and Outlook
In this thesis I have reported on progress concerning two of the most important
aspects of current QKD research. The first part describes concepts and our contri-
bution to the heterogeneous QKD network installed in Vienna within the EU pro-
ject SECOQC. In this network, six different QKD implementations cooperated to
connect six locations via eight QKD links. Seven of them were implemented using
optical fibres, while ours was the only free space optical connection, linking the buil-
ding hosting the exhibition with the QKD backbone. It produced average sifted key
rates of 40 kbit/s and secure key rates of 14 kbit/s with 2.3% QBER over a distance
of 80 m, and ran even during daylight.
The project was part of the ongoing effort to migrate QKD systems from the re-
searchers’ labs towards real-life networks and applications. To this end the limits
in link distance, secure key production rate and interoperability are still being pu-
shed to new records. Free space optical QKD links are especially interesting when
global connections are to be secured. QKD between satellites and the earth have
been shown to be well within reach [65, 77], so that it appears to be feasible to
connect most parts of the world by QKD. Different projects worldwide are aiming
to bring quantum communication technology into space, either onto the ISS or small
low-earth-orbit satellites.
The second part of this thesis deals with the security assessment of real QKD sys-
tems, in particular the one that we have developed. We could show that there was
a loophole in our system that would have allowed an eavesdropper to gain almost
complete knowledge of the sifted key even with today’s technology. The remaining
error between the eavesdropper’s key and the legitimate receiver’s key got as low as
1.17%, without increasing the QBER between Alice and Bob significantly. We also
proposed a simple technical countermeasure against this loophole, preventing other
possible attacks, too: Bob needs to make sure that all of his detectors are ready to
register photons if he wants to use the detection for his sifted key.
In a similar fashion, other attacks can be tackled, too, for instance by an additional
measurement or careful parameter optimization. One has to be careful, of course,
not to open new loopholes by changing the protocol. In general it appears to me that
QKD research will have to focus intensely on the implementation-specific problems
even more in the future. Real systems can of course never be provably secure,
these proofs only work for theoretic models. The important task is to bring model
and implementation closer together, and there certainly has been some progress
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recently [74, 76]. The deviation between theory and implementation is a problem
that is common to classical and quantum cryptography, so it might be helpful if
there were more communication between those two communities in the near future.
In my opinion it is the clear advantage of QKD that the theoretical models are
provably secure. This is in general not true for classical cryptography.
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